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In Defense of the Constitution's Judicial Impeachment 
Standard 
Doc[to]r Franklin was for retaining the [impeachment] clause .... What 
was the practice before this in cases where the chief Magistrate rendered 
himself obnoxious? Why recourse was had to assassination in [which] he 
was not only deprived of his life but of the opportunity of vindicating his 
character. 1 
In May of 1986, Nevada District Chief Judge Harry E. Claiborne 
of Las Vegas began serving a two-year sentence in an Alabama federal 
penitentiary for tax fraud, making him the first sitting federal judge in 
American history to be imprisoned.2 Despite the impracticability of 
fulfilling his judicial duties from prison, 3 Claiborne refused to resign, 
vowing to return to the bench after serving out his sentence.4 In fact, 
he retained his post, and his $78,700 annual salary, for five months of 
his prison term. s 
This situation - apparently both irrational and entirely legal -
could develop because the Constitution explicitly provides only one 
way to remove article III judges6 from office: impeachment by the 
House of Representatives, and conviction by two-thirds of the Senate.7 
In practice, this legislative impeachment procedure is intricate and 
1. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 65 (M. Farrand ed. 1911) 
[hereinafter M. FARRAND] (from James Madison's notes from the Constitutional Convention 
debates, July 20, 1787). 
2. See, e.g., Senate Preparing for Trial of Judge, N.Y. Times, Oct. 5, 1986, at A41, col. 1. 
3. Suggestions that Claiborne might somehow continue to hear his docket while serving his 
sentence were dismissed as "grotesque." See note 213 infra and accompanying text. 
4. See, e.g., Judge on Trial in tlze Senate Asks for 'Spirit of Fair Play,' N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 
1986, at Al4, col. 1. 
5. See, e.g., Claiborne Folfeits Judges/zip, Pension in Vote by Senate, Wall St. J., Oct. IO, 1986, 
at 17, col. 3. 
6. "Article III judges" are those sitting on courts specifically authorized by article III of the 
Constitution. They are thus afforded the special protections and responsibilities delineated in 
that article, such as a nondiminishable salary, and life tenure during "good behavior." U.S. 
CONST. art. III, § 1. These protections are designed to ensure the judges' independence. See 
notes 107-12 infra and accompanying text. The difficult question of which judges qualify as 
article III judges is beyond the scope of this Note. See generally Northern Pipeline Construction 
Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982) (act conferring federal judicial powers on 
bankruptcy judges who are not accorded article III protections is unconstitutional); Geras v. 
Lafayette Display Fixtures, Inc., 742 F.2d 1037 (7th Cir. 1984) (magistrates are not afforded 
article III protections). 
7. The first three articles of the Constitution establish and describe the impeachment process 
for the President, Vice President, and other Civil Officers (including federal judges, see note 68 
infra and accompanying text): 
Art. I, § 2, cl. 5: "The House of Representatives ... shall have the sole Power of Im-
peachment." 
Art. I, § 3, cl. 6: "The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments. When 
sitting for that Purpose they shall be on Oath or Affirmation. When the President of the 
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time-consuming. 8 In Claiborne's case, the House moved fairly quickly 
and approved articles of impeachment on August 6, 1986,9 just two 
months after his final appeal1° was exhausted. A twelve-member Sen-
ate Impeachment Committee heard testimony a mere five weeks later, 
from September 15 to 23, 11 yet Claiborne did not officially forfeit his 
judgeship until his Senate conviction on October 9, 1986. 12 Thus, even 
when accelerated by the pressing need to remove a convicted felon 
from the federal bench, the impeachment process lasted four months, 
prompting cries of impatience.13 
These cumbersome judicial impeachment provisions14 are seldom 
United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside: and no Person shall be convicted 
without the Concurrence of two-thirds of the Members present." 
Art. I, § 3, cl. 7: "Judgement in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to 
removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or 
Profit under the United States: but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and 
subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law." 
Art. II,§ 2, cl. 1: "The President ... shall have power to grant Reprieves and Pardons 
for Offenses against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment." 
Art. II, § 4: "The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States, 
shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or 
other high Crimes and Misdemeanors." 
Art. III, § 2, cl. 3: "The trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by 
Jury." 
8. See Shenon, Impeachment of Judges: A 'Cumbersome Tool,' N.Y. Times, Apr. 2, 1986, at 
Al6, col. 3; Nunn, Judicial Tenure, 54 CHI.[-]KENT L. REV. 29 (1977). Senator Nunn explains 
that it may take weeks of House and Senate time to impeach an "obscure ... misbehaving 
judge." Id. at 30. See also note 151 infra. 
9. H.R. Res. 461, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., S. PUB. No. 17 (1986). 
10. United States v. Claiborne, 790 F.2d 1355 (9th Cir. 1986) (affirming the district court's 
denial of stay of execution of sentence). 
11. The Committee was appointed by the presiding officer of the Senate pursuant to Rule XI 
of the Rules of Procedure and Practice in the Senate When Sitting on Impeachment Trials, S. 
Res. 481, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986). 1 The Impeachment of Harry E. Claiborne, Judge of the 
United States District Court for the District of Nevada, of High Crimes and Misdemeanors: Hear-
ings Before the Senate Impeachment Trial Comm., United States Senate, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., S. 
HRG. No. 812, at 2 (1986) [hereinafter Claiborne Impeachment Trial Comm. Hearings]. 
12. See, e.g., Senate Convicts Judge of'High Crimes, 'Wash. Post, Oct. 10, 1986, at Al, col. 3. 
No court, legislator, or scholar has suggested that Claiborne was not entitled to retain his nomi-
nal office and accompanying compensation until he was officially removed from office, either 
through a formal impeachment process or his own resignation (or death). This fact belies a 
historical scholarly debate over whether impeachment is the exclusive constitutional measure 
available to remove an article III judge from office. Compare, e.g., R. BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 122-80 (1973) (impeachment is not an exclusive remedy), and 
Note, Trial of Good Behavior of Federal Judges, 29 U. VA. L. REV. 876 (1943) (same), with 
Ervin, Separation of Powers: Judicial Independence, 35 LAW & CONTEMP. PR.OBS. 108 (1970) 
(impeachment is exclusive), and Kurland, The Constitution and the Tenure of Federal Judges: 
Some Notes from History, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 665 (1969) (same). For a detailed discussion of 
this controversy, see Part II infra. 
13. "A jury of 100 is totally unworkable," said Senator Howell Heflin in a statement released 
by his office. Natl. L.J., Oct. 20, 1986, at 8, col. 1. His sentiments were not unique: 
Every day that Judge Claiborne continues to collect his salary, Representative Henry J. 
Hyde told the Senate, "is an insult to every law-abiding citizen in this country" and the 
prospect of his return to the bench "is an affront to the dignity of the Federal judiciary and 
an embarrassment to the rule of law." 
Judge on Trial in the Senate asks for 'Spirit of Fair Play, 'N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1986, at Al4, col. 1. 
14. In addition to the constitutional provisions in note 7 supra, art. III, § 1 sets the tenure of 
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invoked. Yet, they are seeing more activity of late than in the preced-
ing half-century. Is Claiborne was the first of two sitting federal judges 
to be convicted of a felony. Southern District of Mississippi Chief 
Judge Walter F. Nixon was convicted of perjury in February 1986I6 
and received a five-year prison sentence. He has not yet been impris-
oned, pending his appeaJ.I7 
Still a third federal judge, Southern District of Florida Judge Alcee 
L. Hastings, faces imminent impeachment.Is Hastings is the first 
judge to be recommended to the U.S. House for removal by the Judi-
cial Conference of the United States. I9 A resolution calling for the 
initiation of impeachment proceedings was introduced in the House in 
April 1987.20 This resolution was based on the Judicial Conference's 
investigation of the circumstances surrounding Hastings' 1983 crimi-
nal trial,2 I in which he was acquitted of conspiracy, bribery, and ob-
struction of justice charges, and after which he resumed his judicial 
duties.22 
The constitutional impeachment language leaves many questions 
unresolved regarding who may be impeached, and when and why they 
federal judges: "The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices 
during good Behavior .... " 
15. The last judge to be impeached before this decade was U.S. District Judge Halsted L. 
Ritter of the Southern District of Florida, in 1936, for improprieties in a receivership case. J. 
BORKIN, THE CORRUPT JUDGE, at 199-200, 243-44 (1962); Senate Convicts Judge of 'High 
Crimes,' Wash. Post, Oct. 10, 1986, at Al, col. 3. 
16. Judge Nixon was, however, acquitted of bribery charges. See U.S. Judge Convicted of 
Peljury; Cleared of Accepting Illegal Gift, N.Y. Times, Feb. 10, 1986, at Al, col. 3. 
17. See Federal Judge Sentenced to Five Years far Peljury, N.Y. Times, Apr. 1, 1986, at A18, 
col. 6. 
18. Ironically, Hastings was the first federal judge to be charged with committing a felony 
while in office. He was acquitted in 1983 of charges that he conspired to solicit a $150,000 bribe. 
Judge Acquitted in '83 Says Panel Seeks Impeachment, N.Y. Times, Aug. 27, 1986, at 9, col. 5. 
Judge Claiborne was the second federal judge to be so charged, and Judge Nixon the third. Down 
Home 'Deal' Plagues a U.S. Judge, Natl. L.J., Feb. 17, 1986, at 1, col. 2. 
However, Judge Hastings was not the first sitting article III judge to be criminally prosecuted 
while in office. In 1973, Seventh Circuit Judge Otto Kerner, Jr. stood trial on criminal charges, 
but his charges related to activities before he became a federal judge. United States v. Isaacs, 493 
F.2d 1124 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974). 
19. The complex recommendation procedure involves a Circuit Judicial Council investigat-
ing committee certifying to the Judicial Conference that consideration of impeachment may be 
warranted. The Conference subsequently must certify its concurrence with this conclusion to the 
House of Representatives. See note 242 infra. 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1982) establishes the Judicial 
Conference of the United States to supervise the business of the federal judiciary and to oversee 
rules of procedure and practice in the federal system. The Conference is composed of the chief 
judges of all the circuits plus a designated district judge from each circuit, and is presided over by 
the Chief Justice of the United States. 
20. Natl. L.J., Apr. 6, 1987, at 29, col. 3. 
21. Acquitted U.S. Judge Takes His Case to Congress, Natl. L.J., Feb. 2, 1987, at 5, col. I. 
22. A jury found Hastings not guilty on Feb. 4, 1983. Hastings v. Judicial Conference of the 
United States, 770 F.2d 1093, 1097 (D.C. Cir. 1985). See also Judge Acquitted in 1983 Says 
Panel Wants Him Impeached, N.Y. Times, Aug. 27, 1986, at A14, col. I. For a more detailed 
discussion of Judge Hastings' case, see Part IIl.B infra. 
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may be impeached. The recently escalating use of these usually inac-
tive provisions has reignited a debate regarding their implementation 
which has lain dormant since articles of impeachment were brought by 
the U.S. House against President Nixon in 1974.23 Congress' response 
has been a cry for legislative action to prevent future "Claibornes," 
centering on the possibility of a constitutional amendment. 24 Con-
gress may be too late, however, to avert such a situation at least once 
more, given Judge Nixon's pledge not to resign.25 
Yet Congress' approach to the current problem overlooks histori-
cal prescriptions, looking forward before looking back. The fact that 
Claiborne can be imprisoned before he is impeached does not reflect 
poor constitutional drafting requiring remedial attention by modern 
legislatures. In fact, the call for a constitutional amendment ignores a 
longstanding interpretation of the Constitution whereby judges must 
be impeached before they are prosecuted and/or imprisoned. This tra-
dition is firmly grounded in the policy goals behind the impeachment 
provisions. The sudden eschewal of the impeachment-before-prosecu-
tion tradition is arguably the real catalyst behind Claiborne's untena-
ble situation. 
This Note explores the traditional interpretation of the Constitu-
tion's impeachment provisions in light of the demands of Judges 
Claiborne's, Nixon's, and Hastings' cases. Part I describes the signals 
indicating analytical shortcomings, and thus the need for reexamina-
tion of the provisions as currently construed. It shows that the troub-
ling results of the recent standard allowing criminal prosecution before 
impeachment are apparent to both the courts and the Congress. Part 
II analyzes the meaning and purpose of the constitutional language, 
and the recent policy challenges to it. This part shows that, in fact, 
the impeachment provisions were carefully chosen by the Constitu-
tion's drafters, who recognized the conflict between preservation of an 
independent judiciary and the need to expeditiously remove miscre-
ants. The impeachment provisions were designed to be cumbersome, 
in order to protect judicial decisionmaking autonomy. To the Fram-
ers, mandating an intricate process for the removal of federal judges 
seemed a small price to pay to ensure the American populace an in-
dependent judiciary. 
23. See, e.g.. REPORT OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, IMPEACHMENT OF 
RICHARD M. NIXON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, H. Doc. No. 1305, 93d Cong., 2d 
Sess. (1974). See generally P. KURLAND, WATERGATE AND THE CONSTITUTION (1978) (discuss-
ing the constitutional issues posed by Watergate); L. JAWORSKI, THE RIGHT AND THE POWER: 
THE PROSECUTION OF WATERGATE (1976). 
24. Several proposed amendments have been discussed, and two were the topic of an August 
1986 hearing before the Subcommittee on the Constitution of the Senate Judiciary Committee. 
See notes 52-55 infra and accompanying text. 
25. See, e.g., Impeachment of Judges: A 'Cumbersome Tool,' N.Y. Times, Apr. 2, 1986, at 
A16, col. 3. 
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Part III juxtaposes the recent treatment of judges against Part H's 
constitutional analysis. It reveals that the current prosecution-before-
impeachment practice disregards goals of the judicial independence 
that spawned the constitutional impeachment provisions. This Note 
shows that, even in the context of today's large complex judiciary, the 
values protected by the impeachment standard are too important to be 
sacrificed as they are when the standard is neglected. That is to say, 
moves to amend the Constitution or alternatively the Senate impeach-
ment procedures26 are overbroad. In the haste to bring an occasional 
bad judge to trial more efficiently, reformers have forgotten to ask 
whether the incremental benefits of effectively dismantling the im-
peachment protections are worth the damage caused to the entire judi-
cial system. 
I. THE SUSPECT NATURE OF THE PROSECUTION-BEFORE-
IMPEACHMENT STANDARD 
Looking only at Judges Claiborne's, Nixon's, and Hastings' trials, 
it would appear that prosecuting a federal judge before impeaching 
him is accepted practice in lower federal courts. Actually, the practice 
developed less than fifteen years ago. In 1973, Seventh Circuit Judge 
Otto Kerner, Jr. was the first sitting federal judge to be subjected to 
criminal prosecution.27 In its decision denying Judge Kemer's appli-
cation to stay his prosecution, United States v. Isaacs, 28 the Seventh 
Circuit held that whereas the Constitution did not expressly forbid the 
criminal prosecution of federal judges, and whereas precedent estab-
lished that Members of Congress could be criminally prosecuted prior 
to their expulsion from the Senate, federal judges could be indicted 
and tried before impeachment.29 Isaacs has become the precedential 
foundation for the modem prosecution-before-impeachment trend. 
However, the results that follow in the Hastings, Nixon, and Claiborne 
cases30 raise doubts about this trend's constitutionality, and indicate a 
26. In addition to the proposed constitutional amendments, see notes 54-55 infra and accom-
panying text, the Senate impeachment proceeding rules themselves, PROCEDURE AND GUIDE-
LINES FOR IMPEACHMENT TRIALS IN THE UNITED STATES SENATE, s. Res. 439, 99th Cong., 2d 
Sess. (rev. ed. 1986), have come under scrutiny. See note 52 infra. One suggested innovation 
attempts to render Judge Claiborne's criminal conviction, standing alone, sufficient grounds for 
impeachment. However, because of Senate "sentiment" that, as a court of impeachment, it 
should do something more than simply ratify a court conviction, this proposal was rejected. See 
Senate Convicts U.S. Judge, Ousting Him from Office, N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 1986, at Al, col. 6; 
see also I Claibome Impeachment Trial Comm. Hearings, supra note 11, at 45-46. 
27. Judge Kerner was convicted of, inter alia, conspiracy, tax evasion, and perjury. United 
States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974). 
28. 493 F.2d 1124. 
29. 493 F.2d at 1142-44. 
30. See United States v. Hastings, 681 F.2d 706, 710 (I Ith Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 
1203 (1983); United States v. Claiborne, 727 F.2d 842, 845-46 (9th Cir.), cert. denied. 469 U.S. 
829 (1984). 
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need for additional judicial examination. 31 
The most troubling aspect of prosecuting a judge before impeach-
ing her is not the prosecution standing alone, but an important prag-
matic consequence: she may be convicted and imprisoned. Because a 
judge cannot hear her docket from prison, jailing her arguably 
removes her from office without benefit of the constitutionally man-
dated impeachment procedure. Though an imprisoned judge may re-
tain her pay and the trappings of office, the loss of her substantive 
responsibilities - i.e., her decisionmaking powers - deprives her of 
"holding" her article III "office" just as effectively as an impeachment 
conviction would. Admittedly, no judge may be appointed to replacs 
her while in prison, but the practical effect on her - the stripping of 
her judicial authority - is identical to that of impeachment. 
Ninth Circuit Judge Kozinski recognized that this dilemma was 
created by Claiborne's situation: 
In affirming [Claiborne's conviction], the [court] cited ... two cases, 
which dealt with whether Claiborne could be prosecuted, concluding that 
Claiborne could ... be imprisoned. Since prosecution does not remove 
Claiborne from the District of Nevada or necessarily interfere with per-
formance of judicial function, while imprisonment does, I do not think 
the issues are identical. 32 
The Claiborne majority's failure to address whether an article III 
judge may be imprisoned before impeachment renders the court's 
holding a near non sequitur. A law student's "brief" of United States 
v. Claiborne would be almost comical: 
Issue: Does imprisonment of a sitting article III judge amount to an 
unconstitutional removal from office without impeachment? 
Holding: Article III judges may be prosecuted before impeachment. 
Early in Claiborne's proceedings, the Ninth Circuit could have re-
lied completely on Isaacs, 33 which did not present the situation of an 
imprisoned judge, to rule against Claiborne. For example, when he 
moved to quash his indictment,34 Claiborne did not face imminent im-
prisonment; thus, his case was very close to Judge Kerner's. However, 
the Ninth Circuit issued two more opinions after Claiborne's convic-
tion, first affirming the District Court's decision to convict35 and then 
denying a stay of execution of sentence.36 Neither opinion deals with 
31. For a detailed discussion of the Hastings and Claiborne substantive reasoning, see Part 
III infra. 
32. United States v. Claiborne, 790 F.2d 1355, 1357 n.2 (9th Cir. 1986) (Kozinski, J., dissent-
ing) (emphasis in original). 
33. 493 F.2d 1124 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974). 
34. United States v. Claiborne, 727 F.2d 842 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 829 (1984). 
35. United States v. Claiborne, 765 F.2d 784 (9th Cir. 1985) {also denying hearing en bane), 
cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1636 {1986); also see the dissents from denial of en bane hearing, 781 F.2d 
1325 (9th Cir. 1985); 781 F.2d 1327, 1334 (9th Cir. 1986). 
36. United States v. Claiborne, 790 F.2d 1355 (9th Cir. 1986). 
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the question of whether incarceration of an article III judge consti-
tutes removal from office. 37 The Supreme Court has never ruled on 
this issue. 38 
Thus, without so much as a majority opinion mention of the word 
"imprison," Claiborne stands as "good" case law for the proposition 
that article III judges may be prosecuted and imprisoned before they 
are removed from office. What prompted the Ninth Circuit to act as if 
the imprisonment issue did not exist? The answer points to a conun-
drum that was too late to resolve once Claiborne was convicted. 
The Claiborne decision may actually reflect that the Ninth Circuit 
faced an impossible political quandary. For them to rule that Clai-
borne had to be impeached before being imprisoned even though a 
jury had convicted him might look as if they were bestowing preferen-
tial treatment upon a felonious colleague.39 Thus, even if a close ex-
amination of the constitutional merits of the issue would have required 
them to reverse Claiborne's conviction, they would have been hard-
pressed to do so. 
This observation is all too poignant, because the political dilemma 
faced by the Claiborne court may be one of the very conflicts that the 
impeachment provisions were designed to avoid.40 As long as the de-
fendant is impeached, and therefore a former federal judge by the time 
she is tried in court, judges will not be required to preside at the trial 
of their peers.41 Thus, the dilemma could have been avoided if 
Claiborne had been impeached before he was prosecuted and con-
victed. Under the current prosecution-before-impeachment standard, 
judges cannot realistically rule a colleague's imprisonment improper 
even if they feel it is because it would seem corrupt, no matter how 
well-founded in doctrine. An interpretation of constitutional language 
which not only circumvents an important issue (here, imprisonment) 
but also creates this "catch-22" signals analytical defects. 
A common way around this political quandary is for the accused 
judge to resign before any judicial proceedings. Of the fifty-five judges 
37. Nor did Justice Rehnquist address the issue in his one-and-a-half page opinion (sitting 
alone in his capacity as Ninth Circuit Justice) affirming the denial of Claiborne's motion to stay 
criminal proceedings pending determination of the constitutionality of his prosecution. Clai-
borne v. United States, 465 U.S. 1305 (1984). 
38. The Supreme Court has denied Claiborne certiorari twice, without opinion. United 
States v. Claiborne, 469 U.S. 829 (1984); United States v. Claiborne, 106 S. Ct. 1636 (1986). 
39. See United States v. Claiborne, 781 F.2d 1327, 1331-32 (9th Cir. 1986) (Reinhardt, J., 
dissenting from denial of en bane hearing). 
40. See Part II.B infra. 
41. This problem is partially resolved by judges' ability to recuse themselves, under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 455 (1982), from cases in which they feel they would not be impartial. However, there is 
arguably no judge in the federal system who could adjudicate another judge's trial completely 
without bias, because of the errant judge's tarnishing effect upon the judiciary as a whole. See 
generally text at notes 191-93 infra. 
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that were investigated by Congress before 1973,42 seventeen resigned 
at some point during the investigation process, but there were an "un-
determined number of judges who resigned upon mere threat of in-
quiry; for them there are no adequate records. "43 Eight judges and 
one United States Supreme Court Justice44 have been impeached, and 
four judges have been convicted.45 Eight judges have been censured 
but not impeached; the rest were absolved of impeachable 
misconduct. 46 
Before Isaacs, the general practice for bringing charges against an 
article III judge involved the Attorney General, or a district attorney, 
notifying the Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee of the need 
for action against the judge.47 The House would then decide whether 
42. J. BORKIN, supra note 15, at 204; for a compilation of the fifty-four judges and one 
Supreme Court Justice who were the subject of congressional inquiry through 1962, and the 
circumstances and disposition of each case, see id. at 219-58. See also Nunn, supra note 8, at 31. 
43. J. BORKIN, supra note 15, at 204. 
44. The eight impeached judges are: Third Circuit Judge Robert W. Archbald, impeached 
by the House and convicted by the Senate in 1913 for accepting "loans" and a "gift" from liti-
gants before him, and for using his official position to obtain coal leases, id. at 221-22; Illinois 
District Judge George W. English, whose resignation in 1925 terminated his impeachment pro-
ceedings on charges of partiality and favoritism in appointing receivers, attorneys, and banks in 
which to deposit bankruptcy funds, id. at 231-32; Tennessee District Judge West H. Humphreys, 
impeached by the House and convicted by the Senate in 1862, for "(s]upporting the Secession 
movement, failing to hold court, [and] accepting judicial commission in hostility to the United 
States," id. at 234; California District Judge Harold Louderback, impeached by the House and 
acquitted by the Senate in 1932, on charges of favoritism in appointment of receivers, and al-
lowing them excessive fees, id. at 238; Missouri District Judge James H. Peck, impeached by the 
House and acquitted by the Senate in 1830 on charges of tyrannous treatment of counsel, id. at 
240-41; New Hampshire District Judge John Pickering, impeached by the House and removed 
from the bench by the Senate in 1804 on charges of drunkenness, tyrannous conduct, and disre-
gard for terms of statutes, id. at 242-43; Florida District Judge Halsted L. Ritter, impeached by 
the House and convicted by the Senate in 1936 on charges of bankruptcy irregularities, kick-
backs, and income tax evasion, id. at 243-44; and Florida District Judge Charles H. Swayne, 
impeached by the House and acquitted by the Senate in 1905 on charges of bankruptcy irregular-
ities, claiming per diem expenses to which he was not entitled, use of a private railroad car 
belonging to a railroad in receivership in his court, and nonresidence, id. at 248. Associate 
Supreme Court Justice Samuel Chase was impeached by the House and acquitted by the Senate 
in 1804-1805, on charges of alleged misconduct at trials dealing with the Sedition Law. Id. at 
226-27. While there have been several other congressional gestures toward impeaching Supreme 
Court Justices, none of these has resulted in formal proceedings, a fact leading some commenta-
tors to charge that these were more politically than substantively motivated. See also note 135 
infra and accompanying text. 
45. The four were New Hampshire District Judge John Pickering (1804), Tennessee District 
Judge West H. Humphreys (1862), Third Circuit Judge Robert W. Archbald (1913), and Florida 
District Judge Halsted L. Ritter (1936). See note 44 supra. 
46. J. BORKIN, supra note 15, at 204. 
47. See J. BORKIN, supra note 15, at 44 {describing the procedure used to bring charges 
against Second Circuit Senior Judge Martin T. Manton in January, 1939). See generally Feerick, 
Impeachi11g Federal Judges: A Study af the Co11stitutio11a/ Pravisio11s, 39 FORDHAM L. REV. l 
(1970) (describing the procedures used to bring charges against impeached judges). For example, 
the Florida legislature recommended to the House that charges be brought against Judge 
Swayne, id. at 37; the Interstate Commerce Commission informed the Attorney General, who 
instigated the House action against Judge Archbald, id. at 39; and the President informed the 
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or not to issue articles of impeachment. If articles were issued, the 
judge would be tried before the Senate. 
It is not clear why, after nearly two centuries of accusing judges in 
the House of Representatives, prosecutors began to regularly bring 
charges against judges in courts of law in 1973.48 This unexplained 
retreat from the impeachment-first practice fuels suspicions about the 
new standard that were initially raised when the Ninth Circuit at-
tempted to brush aside the practical effects of the change. Yet the 
current congressional response to the new "prosecution first" standard 
may be the clearest signal that, constitutionally, something is wrong. 
Each invocation of the onerous impeachment process49 has 
prompted numerous calls for some type of reform. 50 The current re-
Attorney General who informed the House of Representatives of the alleged wrongdoings of 
Judges Pickering and Louderback, id. at 26, 44. 
Prior to Judge Kerner's case, criminal proceedings had been brought against two active 
judges. Southern District of New York District Judge Francis Winslow was indicted in 1929, 
and resigned before trial commenced. Third Circuit Court of Appeals Judge John Warren Davis 
was indicted and stood trial twice in 1941, but the indictment was dismissed. He ultimately 
resigned later that same year. See J. BORKIN, supra note IS, at 119-20, 2SS-S6. However, neither 
judge claimed immunity from criminal prosecution prior to impeachment, thus no opinions were 
written on this issue. See United States v. Hastings, 681 F.2d 706, 709 n.7 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. 
denied, 4S9 U.S. 1203 (1983). 
48. There has been growing public demand over the past two decades to make governmental 
officials, including judges, more accountable for their actions. See Kaufman, Lions or Jackals: 
The Function of a Code of Judicial Ethics, 3S LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 3-4 (1970). This may 
have partially motivated the judicial proceedings. One state supreme court has attributed this 
"crisis of confidence" at least in part to the Watergate scandal. See Matter of Johnson, S68 P.2d 
8SS, 868 (Wyo. 1977). 
49. See notes 8 & 13 supra and accompanying text. 
SO. For example, following Judge Ritter's impeachment in 1936, proposed statutes in Con-
gress would have created a new tribunal for the trial and removal of federal judges. S. 4S27 and 
H.R. 2271, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936) both provided for judicial branch determination of an 
absence of "good behavior" under U.S. CONST. art. III, § I in order to trigger removal. Both 
legislative proposals received considerable support, see M. OTIS, A PROPOSED TRIBUNAL: Is IT 
CONSTITUTIONAL? 13-16 (1939), and prompted a great deal of scholarly writing. See, e.g., id.; 
Ethridge, The Law of Impeachment, 8 MISS. L.J. 283 (1936); Note, The Exclusiveness of the 
Impeachment Power Under the Constitution, SI HARV. L. REV. 330 (1937); Yankwich, Impeach-
ment of Civil Officers under the Federal Constitution, 26 GEO. L.J. 849 (1938). 
In the late 1960s, the Senate's rejection of two of President Nixon's Supreme Court nominees 
focused attention on judicial appointment and removal procedures. There were proposed in 
Congress "well over two dozen measures designed to place new restrictions on federal judges." 
Ervin, supra note 12, at 122. Senate Bill IS06, and its accompanying bills S. 1S07 through S. 
IS16, 9lst Cong., 1st Sess. (1969), introduced by Sen. Joseph Tydings, were given particular 
attention in the Senate at that time. Known as the Judicial Reform Act, S. 1506 would have 
created a five-member Commission on Judicial Disabilities and Tenure within the judicial branch 
to hear complaints about federal judges. If four members of the Commission found the judge's 
conduct inconsistent with the "good behavior" standard, the Commission would recommend 
removal to the Judicial Conference. The Conference was empowered by the Act to remove 
judges, subject to Supreme Court discretionary review of its decisions. See Ervin, supra note 12, 
at 123; see generally Comment, The Limitations of Article III 011 the Proposed Judicial Remo1•al 
Machinery: S. 1506, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 1064 (1970); see also R. BERGER, supra note 12, at 94. 
Following Judge Hastings' trial, Congress again attempted to make judicial discipline more 
efficient by giving the Judicial Councils more prerogative to discipline their judges for "conduct 
prejudicial to the effective and expeditious administration of the business of the courts." 28 
U.S.C. § 372(c)(l) (1982). Each Judicial Council is composed ofa number of the circuit's active 
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formers' thrust is unusual, however, in that legislative impeachment 
proposals have usually been for statutory supplements to the impeach-
ment removal power.51 In contrast, recent legislative focus has been 
primarily on the need to amend the Constitution. 52 
On August 12, 1986, the Subcommittee on the Constitution of the 
Senate Judiciary Committee held a hearing on two proposed constitu-
tional amendments. Both proposals "provide for automatic removal 
of federal officers upon conviction of a felony and exhaustion of all 
direct appeals."53 S.J. Res. 37054 provides for automatic forfeiture of 
office and all prerogatives by any judge convicted of a crime. S.J. Res. 
district and circuit judges; is presided over by the chief judge of the circuit; and is charged with 
"mak[ing] all necessary orders for the effective and expeditious administration of the business of 
the courts" in its circuit. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 332, 62 Stat. 902 (current version at 28 
U.S.C. § 332 (1982)). In pursuit of efficiency, therefore, Congress enacted the Judicial Councils 
Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, 28 U.S.C. §§ 331, 332(a), 372(c), 604 
(1982) [hereinafter Judicial Conduct Act]. See note 242 infra and accompanying text. However, 
the Judicial Conduct Act and its predecessor bills met with scholarly opposition. See, e.g., Kauf-
man, Chilling Judicial Independence, 88 YALE L.J. 681 (1979) [hereinafter Kaufman, Chilling 
Independence]; Kaufman, The Essence of Judicial Independence, SO CoLUM. L. REV. 671 (1980). 
51. See, e.g., S. 1506, 91st Cong., !st Sess. (1969) (described in note 50, supra); H.R. 146, 
77th Cong., !st Sess., 87 CONG. REC. 8167 (1941) (granting removal power to three-member 
"court of appeals" chosen by the Chief Justice from any three appeals court judges); S. 4527, 
74th Cong., 2d Sess., 80 CONG. REC. 5937 (1936) (empowering a new court, composed of the ten 
chief judges of the circuits, with exclusive jurisdiction over removal cases). 
52. In addition to the two amendments discussed at length, see notes 54-55 infra and accom-
panying text, Senator Howell Heflin stated shortly after the Senate voted to impeach Judge Clai-
borne that he too would introduce a constitutional amendment similar to one he wrote for the 
Alabama state constitution in 1973 while that state's chief justice. Heflin's amendment would 
remove Congress from the judicial impeachment procedure altogether. Will Claiborne's Im-
peachment Spur Overhaul of Process?, Natl. L.J., Oct. 20, 1986, at 8, col. I. Additionally, Rep. 
Robert Kastenmeier, Chairman of the Courts Subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee, 
indicated that the House also plans to hold hearings on the Judicial Conduct Act to consider a 
constitutional amendment as well as other potential changes. Id. 
Alternatively, a few senators are proposing modification of Senate rules to expedite impeach-
ment proceedings when the defendant has already been convicted by a court. In fact, there 
already were some changes made in internal Senate rules to expedite Judge Claiborne's trial. For 
example, the Senate adopted procedures, available since 1935, S. Res. 18, 74th Cong., !st Sess., 
79 CONG. REC. 8309-10 (1935), under which a twelve-senator committee took evidence and re-
ported their findings to the Senate. By avoiding a full Senate trial, Senate disruption was mini-
mized. S. Res. 481, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 132 CONG. REC. 11759-60 (daily ed. Aug. 14, 1986); 
Senate Convicts U.S. Judge, Ousting Him from Office, N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 1986, at Al, col. 12. 
Claiborne's argument - that the Constitution entitled him to the right to call witnesses before 
the entire Senate - was rejected. 1 Claiborne Impeachment Trial Comm. Hearings, supra note 
11, at 112-13, 240-43, 272-73; see also Senate Votes to Bar Witnesses in the Trial of Judge. N.Y. 
Times, Oct. 9, 1986, at A31, col. l; Effort to Block Vote 011 Claiborne Rejected, Wash. Post, Oct. 
9, 1986, at A3, col. I. Another proposed procedural revision, which would have rendered Clai-
borne's felony conviction itself sufficient grounds for his removal from office, was rejected by the 
Senate, 46 to 17, with 35 abstentions. See, e.g., Senate Convicts Judge of 'High Crimes,' Wash. 
Post, Oct. 10, 1986, at Al, col. 3. 
53. Hearing on S.J. Res. 364 and S.J. Res. 370 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the 
Senate Comm. 011 the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (Aug. 12, 1986) (statement of then-Subcom-
mittee Chairman Orrin G. Hatch). 
54. Introduced June 26, 1986, by Senator Dennis DeConcini, S.J. Res. 370, 99th Cong., 2d 
Sess., 132 CONG. REC. S8746 (daily ed. June 26, 1986), provides, 
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36455 broadens the class of those to whom forfeiture applies to include 
any U.S. officer appointed by the President and approved by the Sen-
ate. Senator DeConcini, when introducing S.J. Res. 370, was straight-
forward about its purpose: "The impetus for this resolution clearly 
stems from the stunning state of events that surround . . . Judge . . . 
Claiborne."56 Senator Thurmond's introductory remarks to S.J. Res. 
364 do not mention Claiborne by name, but Claiborne is unmistakably 
its catalyst as well. ~7 
However, the hearing was dominated by testimony urging rejec-
tion of the amendments. 58 Two witnesses, a federal court of appeals 
judge and a law professor, 59 urged that the admitted defects in the 
existing provisions do not warrant the extraordinary remedy of a con-
stitutional amendment. 60 The fact that the Senators advocate this "ex-
traordinary remedy" is indicative of their awareness of the uniqueness 
of this problem. 
More significantly, advocacy of the amendment answers one ques-
tion by raising numerous others. First, it indicates that some Mem-
bers of Congress assume impeachment to be an exclusive 
constitutional procedure for removing federal judges, 61 an assumption 
which is historically controversial. If the procedure were not exclu-
ARTICLE 
SECTION 1. A judge appointed pursuant to Article III shall, upon conviction of a felony 
and exhaustion of all direct appeals, forfeit office and benefits thereof. 
SECTION 2. The Congress shall have the power by appropriate legislation to set stan-
dards and guidelines by which the Supreme Court may discipline judges appointed pursuant 
to Article III who bring disrepute on the Federal courts or the administration of justice by 
the courts. Such discipline may include removal from office and diminution of 
compensation. 
55. Introduced June 18, 1986, by then-Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Strom Thur-
mond, S.J. Res. 364, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 132 CONG. REC. S7867 (daily ed. June 18, 1986), 
provides, 
ARTICLE 
Any officer of the United States appointed by the President with the advice and consent 
of the Senate, upon conviction of a felony and exhaustion of all direct appeals, shall forfeit 
office and all prerogatives, benefits, or compensation thereof. 
56. 132 CONG. REC. S8746 (daily ed. June 26, 1986) (statement of Sen. DeConcini). 
57. "Under current Constitution[al] law ... it is possible for certain officers of the United 
States who are appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate to continue 
to receive a salary after ... a [felony] conviction." 132 CONG. REC. S7867 (daily ed. June 18, 
1986) (statement of Sen. Thurmond). 
58. See the prepared statement of Ninth Circuit Judge J. Clifford Wallace [hereinafter Judge 
Wallace statement], and the prepared statement of University of Pennsylvania Law School Pro-
fessor Stephen B. Burbank [hereinafter Professor Burbank statement], at the Hearing on S.J. Res. 
364 and S.J. Res. 370 Before the Subcommittee on the Constitution of the Senate Committee on 
the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (Aug. 12, 1986) (unpublished papers on file with the Michigan 
Law Review). 
59. U.S. Ninth Circuit Judge J. Clifford Wallace and University of Pennsylvania Law School 
Professor Stephen B. Burbank. 
60. See Professor Burbank statement, supra note 58, at 1-2. 
61. "My understanding about the need for constitutional amendment to effect a change in life 
tenure [of federal judges] is buttressed by the repeated introduction in both Houses of Congress 
of amendments to that end." Kurland, supra note 12, at 697 (emphasis added). 
November 1987] Note - Judicial Impeachment 431 
sive, there would be no need to amend the document to provide for an 
alternative method.62 
Second, and more importantly, given that imprisonment of an arti-
cle III judge likely constitutes an alternative form of removal, 63 the 
call for an amendment can be seen as an effort to mold the Constitu-
tion to the case law rather than vice versa. Though this process may 
not actively trouble Members of Congress, it must heighten concerns 
about the prosecution-first standard: If the prosecution-first cases 
could be reconciled with the Constitution as it stands, an amendment 
to the document would be redundant. 
Finally, consider this last point together with the practical difficul-
ties inherent in the constitutional amendment process. It is very diffi-
cult for any amendment to be ratified. 64 A failed amendment could 
actually exacerbate the current controversy by drawing attention to 
the shortcomings of the prosecution-before-impeachment standard, 
but then leaving the troublesome procedure in place. That is, when 
Congress leaves us with the admittedly problematic prosecution-
before-impeachment standard, what happens next? Once again, we 
will be left wondering whether Congress is trying to remedy a situa-
tion it has not clearly identified. By focusing only on the inefficiency 
of allowing a jailed article III judge to continue to draw his salary 
before impeachment, Congress overlooks the fundamental question of 
whether the Constitution actually mandates (let alone allows) such a 
system. Part II will explore answers found in the Constitution's text, 
original intent, and modern policy and consequences. 
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD: EXCLUSIVITY 
A. The Text 
Nowhere does the Constitution say that impeachment is the only 
way to remove a federal judge. Ironically, the only mention of the 
word "impeachment" in article III is in the provision barring jury tri-
als in cases of impeachment. 65 Yet the exclusivity issue is central to 
the cases of Judges Claiborne, Hastings, and Nixon, because if im-
62. See Part II infra. 
63. See text at notes 31-33 supra & 213-24 infra. 
64. Article V of the U.S. Constitution requires ratification by three-fourths of the states for 
approval of any amendment, after either approval by two-thirds of both houses of Congress, or 
application for a Constitutional Convention by two-thirds of the states' legislatures. Since the 
adoption of Article V, only 26 of approximately 5,000 proposed constitutional amendments have 
been added to the document. Five others were adopted by Congress but not ratified by the states. 
M. BERRY, WHY ERA FAILED - POLITICS, WOMEN'S RIGHTS, AND THE AMENDING PROCESS 
OF THE CONSTITUTION 6 (1986). Berry's book illustrates that the "deliberately ... difficult" 
constitutional amendment process, id. at 4, renders passage of an amendment arduous. Thus, it 
took fifty-seven years from its first introduction in Congress for the thirteenth amendment ending 
slavery to be ratified, id. at 10, and the Equal Rights Amendment was rejected by a slim three 
state margin (of thirty-eight required) after a decade-long ratification fight. 
65. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3; see note 7 supra. 
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peachment is not the sole constitutional remedy for judicial removal, 
then it does not matter whether imprisonment is tantamount to re-
moval from office. Imprisonment could be one of several legitimate 
alternative removal methods to impeachment. 
Nonetheless, the "verdict of history"66 is that impeachment is the 
only way to remove article III judges from office, despite the ambigui-
ties and contradictions in the constitutional language. 67 There has 
66. Remarks of University of Pennsylvania Law Professor Stephen B. Burbank at the Ke11· 
tucky Law Journal Federal Judicial Impeachment and Discipline Symposium (Oct. 12, 1987); see 
also notes 81-86 infra and accompanying text. 
67. See notes 7 & 14 supra. For example, art. II, § 4 provides that "[t]he President, Vice 
President, and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeach· 
ment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors." Art. 
III, § 1, however, provides that "[t]he Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold 
their Offices during good Behavior." It is not clear whether a judge clearly guilty of "bad behav· 
ior" (assuming the phrase can be defined) may still not have behaved badly enough to be guilty of 
an impeachable "high crime"; there is a potentially disturbing "hiatus between crimes warrant· 
ing impeachment and the full reach of that ... misconduct which ends the judge's right to 
remain in office." M. Ons, supra note 50, at 37. The intended meaning of "good behavior" is at 
least facially addressed by Alexander Hamilton in The Federalist, to provide for the indepen-
dence of the judiciary through their "permanency in office." THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 539, 
546-47 (A. Hamilton) (H. Dawson ed. 1863). However, the Constitutional Convention of 1787 
developed "high crimes and misdemeanors" as compromise language. See 1 M. FARRAND, supra 
note 1, at 230; 2 id. at 64, 172, 174, 186, 443, 495, 545, 550. Its "meaning" remains a mystery. 
For reasoning by example that "high crimes and misdemeanors" covers "general office miscon· 
duct," see Yankwich, supra note 50, at 850-61. It is settled that "high crimes" reach more than 
only indictable offenses. See Ritter v. United States, 84 Ct. Cl. 293 (1936), cert. denied, 300 U.S. 
668 (1937); see also ten Broek, Partisan Politics and Federal Judgeship Impeachments Since 1903, 
23 MINN. L. REV. 185 (1938) (demonstrating that both Judges Archbald and Ritter were con· 
victed of articles of impeachment which did not amount to indictable offenses). But cf. Judge 
Claiborne's Motion to Dismiss the Articles of Impeachment on the Grounds that They Do Not 
State Impeachable 9ffenses, in 1 Claiborne Impeachment Trial Comm. Hearings, supra note 11, 
at 244-51. 
Debate on the impeachment process tends to focus on which noncriminal acts are impeacha-
ble offenses; and, whether every criminal act is an impeachable offense. See generally C. BLACK, 
IMPEACHMENT: A HANDBOOK 33-40 (1974); A. SIMPSON, A TREATISE ON FEDERAi. IM· 
PEACHMENTS 30-49 (1916); R. BERGER, supra note 12, at 53-102. The issue arises in the context 
of presidential as well as judicial impeachments. See, e.g., 116 CONG. REC. 11913 (an "impeach· 
able offense is whatever a majority of the House of Representatives considers it to be at a given 
moment in history") (remarks of then-Rep. Gerald Ford). Ford's remarks are criticized in Feer· 
ick, supra note 47, at 57. 
Even clear definitions of "high crimes" and "good behavior" would not completely resolve 
the "hiatus" dilemma, which is usually argued in the context of whether impeachment is the 
exclusive constitutional judicial removal method. If impeachment is an exclusive remedy, then 
there is no process by which a judge can be disciplined for mere "bad behavior," because she 
cannot be impeached for anything short of "high crimes." For the argument that thus constru-
ing impeachment as exclusive would render the "good behavior" clause impotent, therefore the 
existence of separate clauses presupposes the existence of alternatives for removal other than 
impeachment, see R. BERGER, supra note 12, at 122-80; Shartel, Federal Judges-Appoi11tme11t, 
Supervision, and Removal - Some Possibilities Under the Co11stitutio11, Part III: Judicial Re· 
moval of Unfit District and Circuit Judges, 28 MICH. L. REV. 870 (1930); Note, Tlze Chandler 
J11cide111 a11d Problems of Judicial Removal, 19 STAN. L. REV. 448 (1967) [hereinafter Note, The 
Chandler l11cide111]; cf. Feerick, supra note 47 (arguing that the two standards are different, but 
that impeachment is nonetheless the sole removal method, and was intended to be used spar· 
ingly). 
Other scholars and some courts, relying on Alexander Hamilton's Statement, supra, assert 
that "good behavior" only defines judicial tenure, and does not address the issue of what qualifies 
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never been much doubt that the Framers intended judges to be consid-
ered "civil officers"68 subject to impeachment under article II, section 
4, 69 but the argument that impeachment should be an exclusive re-
moval method has been the subject of extensive scholarly debate. 
The context of this debate is illuminating. To the Framers, im-
peachment and removal were not always identical. In fact, there were 
a number of alternative removal methods that the Framers could have 
adopted, but did not. In English law, impeachment was one of several 
ways to remove public officials from office, but was differentiated from 
the others in that it had a unique technical meaning which disqualified 
defendants from holding future office.70 The early eighteenth-century 
English constitutional system contained procedures allowing for re-
moval of judges by any of the three branches of government. Parlia-
ment could remove through their choice of impeachment, bill of 
attainder, or address to the King. The King initially could remove the 
judges of the superior courts (Exchequer, King's Bench, and Common 
Pleas) through language giving the judge tenure durante bene placito 
as an impeachable offense. See O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 549 (1933) (good 
behavior means life or permanent tenure); Shurtleff v. United States, 189 U.S. 311, 316 (1903) 
(same); A. SIMPSON, supra, at 54 (arguing that even if, by constitutional amendment, judges 
served periodic instead of life terms, this would not alter the standards by which they could be 
impeached). This approach nonetheless requires the two clauses to be read together to give the 
document meaning. As put by one scholar in 1914, "The judicial-tenure clause amplifies the 
removal clause, which proximately precedes it in the Constitution. Each borrows cogency and 
light from the other." W. BROWN, IMPEACHMENT - A MONOGRAPH ON THE IMPEACHMENT 
OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 10 (1914) (published as s. Doc. No. 358, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1914)). This argument also understands "good behavior" to expect a higher level of conduct 
than is expected from the ordinary citizen, but does not see a conflict between the two standards. 
Instead, it sees impeachment as a mechanism by which judges can be removed from office for 
violations of the "good behavior" standard even if they would not be subject to other sanctions, 
such as criminal prosecution. See generally M. OTIS, supra note 50; Note, supra note 50; W. 
BROWN, supra. 
68. See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, THE CONSTITU-
TION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 574-75 (1973). 
The "civil officers" classification may have been used by the Framers to distinguish American 
impeachment from English impeachment, under which any person - not only those holding 
offices of public responsibility - could be impeached. The Framers explicitly rejected this un-
limited application of impeachment. W. BROWN, supra note 67, at 4-6; P.C. HOFFER & N.E.H. 
HULL, IMPEACHMENT IN AMERICA, 1635-1805, at xi, 97 (1984). 
69. See THE FEDERALIST No. 79, at 550 (A. Hamilton) (H. Dawson ed. 1863) ("The precau-
tions for [federal judges'] responsibility are comprised in the Article respecting impeachments. 
They are liable to be impeached for malconduct, by the House-of Representatives, and tried by 
the Senate; and, if convicted, may be dismissed from office, and disqualified from holding any 
other."). The argument against inclusion of judicial officers in the "civil officers" language fo-
cused on the fact that the impeachment provision is contained in article II, the article regarding 
the executive branch. See generally M. OTIS, supra note 50 at 25; L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW § 3-6, at 49 n.5 (1978). 
70. Shartel, supra note 67, at 880-84, 892. Shartel argues that the Framers must have in-
tended "impeachment" to retain its technical meaning, otherwise they would have used the term 
"remove." Thus, he argues, the Framers did not intend impeachment to be an exclusive method 
of removal, but meant for other common law remedies, see text at notes 71-72 infra. to survive. 
Shartel, supra note 67, at 881-83, 892-93. See also Note, The Chandler Incident, supra note 67, at 
461-62. 
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(during good pleasure, i.e., at the King's will), though he lost removal 
power in 1701 under the Act of Settlement, from which time judges 
were to be appointed quamdiu se bene gesserint (during good behav-
ior). Finally, the judiciary itself could oust an errant superior court 
judge through writ of scire facias, and inferior court judges by quo 
warranto. The United States Constitution specifically retained some of 
these elements, i.e., the impeachment process and the "good behavior" 
standard, while it overtly rejected the bill of attainder.71 The full im-
pact of the exclusivity argument can be understood only upon recogni-
tion that, to the Framers, removal did not mean only impeachment. 
Although the consequences of the various removal procedures were 
the same as applied to an individual judge - being stripped of judicial 
authority and salary - the circumstances under which each proce-
dure would be appropriate depended on the nature of the allegation 
against the judge. Consolidating all judicial removals under the im-
peachment umbrella was a striking departure from English 
precedent. 72 
Possibly the most thorough exposition of the constitutional inter-
pretation insisting that impeachment is the only way to remove federal 
judges was made by Judge Merrill E. Otis in A Proposed Tribunal: Is 
It Constitutional? 13 Noting that the Framers gave the House the "sole 
power of impeachment,"74 and the Senate the "sole power to try all 
impeachments,"75 Judge Otis continued, 
The Framers certainly would not have been so meticulous in the use 
of words, so careful to use this particularly strong word in the vesting of 
the impeachment power, unless they had in mind ... to make it clear to 
all forever that, in the American system, no significance should be given 
to any English precedent, ifthere were any, whereby the power to charge 
misconduct for the purpose of obtaining removal of a civil officer from 
office was held to lodged in any other than that legislative body directly 
representing the whole people.76 
The crux of Otis' argument is that the removal power rests solely with 
the House and the Senate, and cannot be delegated to any other body, 
administrative or judicial, within the boundaries set by the constitu-
tional text. 77 
71. 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 1, at 428-29. For a complete discussion of the early English 
background, see Shartel, supra note 67, at 880-84. See also Schoenbaum, A Historical Look al 
Judicial Discipline, 54 CHl.[-]KENT L. REV. l (1977). 
72. Shartel, supra note 67, at 880. 
73. M. OTIS, supra note 50, at 25-31. 
74. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5 (emphasis added). 
75. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6 (emphasis added). 
76. M. OTIS, supra note 50, at 29-30. 
77. Id. at 31; see also Kurland, supra note 12, at 692 ("The use of the word 'sole' in those two 
particulars undoubtedly is most significant .... [T]he conclusion is inescapable that the only way 
you can try these judges is by the method that the Constitution allows us ..•• ") (quoting Con-
gressman Celler). 
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Proponents of the argument that impeachment is not an exclusive 
method for removing federal judges are quick to point out, quite 
rightly, that Judge Otis argues around the problem. He proves merely 
that Congress has the sole right to bring and try impeachments, but he 
begs the question of whether impeachment is the "sole" means of re-
moval. 78 Thus, Otis' logic is not entirely convincing. Though his view 
enjoys some scholarly support,79 most literature endorses an approach 
allowing for removal other than by impeachment alone. 80 
Yet, as mentioned, Judge Otis still trumps, if only by universal ac-
quiescence to his position. 8 I Witness that no one suggested there was 
any legal way to stop paying Judge Claiborne his $78,700 annual sal-
ary save for impeachment. 82 Lower court decisions abound with cate-
gorical statements that impeachment is the only constitutional method 
for removing federal judges,83 and a 1970 Supreme Court decision, 
Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit, 84 rests on this as-
sumption as well. This constitutional directive is also reflected in the 
78. R. BERGER, supra note 12, at 136. 
79. See, e.g .. Kurland, supra note 12; Ziskind, Judicial Tenure in the American Constitution: 
English and American Precedents, 1969 SUP. Cr. REV. 135; Note, Constitutional Judicial Tenure 
Legislation? The Words May Be New, But the Song Sounds the Same, 8 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 
843 (1981). 
80. See, e.g., A. SIMPSON, supra note 67, at 71-77; Shartel, supra note 67; Note, The Chandler 
Incident, supra note 67; Comment, Removal of Federal Judges - New Alternatives to an Old 
Problem: Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit, 13 UCLA L. REv. 1385 (1966) 
[hereinafter Comment, Removal]; Yankwich, supra note 50, at 862-67. 
81. See Note, supra note 50, at 336. Admittedly, both the legislature and the judiciary may 
have impure motives which prompt their acquiescence to an exclusive impeachment standard. 
Judges may hold biases in favor of guarding their own life tenures; Congress may want to protect 
its monopoly on judicial removal. 
82. Neither does anyone suggest that Claiborne should repay any salary for the period during 
which he was imprisoned before his impeachment. In 1983, just one year after it denied Judge 
Hastings a stay of his criminal prosecution, the Eleventh Circuit specifically addressed this ancil-
lary issue. In Bergen v. Edenfield, 701 F.2d 906 (11th Cir. 1983), the court dismissed a suit 
where plaintiff sought a declaration that a federal judge had vacated his office, and sought return 
of all compensation received for the period during which his duties were neglected. The dismissal 
was based partially on the fact that there was "simply no legal basis for th[e] suit." 701 F.2d at 
908 ("The only mechanism for removal of a federal judge provided in the Constitution is the 
impeachment process."). 
83. See, e.g., Hastings v. Judicial Conference of the United States, 770 F.2d 1093, 1106 (D.C. 
Cir. 1985) (Edwards, J., concurring) ("The Constitution has long been understood to establish 
impeachment as the only method available to the coordinate branches for the actual removal of 
judges from offices.") (emphasis added); Bergen, 701 F.2d at 908. 
A 1936 ruling on the related issue of judicial review of impeachments also furthers the "ex-
clusivity" interpretation of the impeachment clause. In response to Judge Ritter's challenge to 
the constitutionality of his Senate impeachment, see Ritter v. United States, 84 Ct. Cl. 293 
(1936), cert. denied, 300 U.S. 668 (1937), the Court of Claims held that the Senate's art. I,§ 3, cl. 
6 "sole power to try impeachments" meant that "no other tribunal should have any jurisdiction 
of the cases tried under the provisions with reference to impeachment." 84 Ct. Cl. at 296. This 
reading of the clause to preclude judicial review of impeachments has not since been judicially 
challenged. For a discussion of why this is sound jurisprudence, see C. BLACK, supra note 67, at 
53-64. But compare R. BERGER, supra note' 12, at 103-21 (disagreeing with Black). 
84. For an extensive discussion of Chandler. 398 U.S. 74 (1970), see notes 216-24 infra and 
accompanying text. 
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Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 
1980,85 which Congress carefully structured so as not to disturb its 
own retention of exclusive power to remove federal judges.86 And 
most recently, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit affirmed 
the Judicial Conference's actions against Judge Hastings explicitly 
based on the fact that removal power under the Act vests only in Con-
gress, not in the Conference. 87 
Although the textually-based arguments for the exclusivity of im-
peachment are not satisfying, the structure of the Constitution but-
tresses the assertion that impeachment is an exclusive removal 
method. Structural arguments are roughly based on the canon of con-
struction expressio unius, exclusio alterius. Rationalizing that the im-
peachment provision is exclusive because it is the only judicial removal 
mechanism provided by the Constitution, this theory finds support 
from a statement by Alexander Hamilton in 1788: "This is the only 
provision on the point, which is consistent with the necessary indepen-
dence of the Judicial character .... " 88 The expressio unius argument 
presumes that the Constitution is a carefully drafted document. 89 
Constitutional protections were precisely apportioned among govern-
mental branches. They afford each branch exactly the protections nec-
essary for successful execution of that branch's unique functions. 
Assuming the Framers meant only what they said, it is conclusive that 
no methods save impeachment are mentioned for the removal of fed-
eral judges. 90 
Opponents of this interpretation first point out that the Supreme 
Court has indicated that canons of construction are not fixed rules of 
85. 28 U.S.C. §§ 331, 332(a), 372(c), 604 (1982). See also note 50 supra (discussion of the 
Judicial Conduct Act). 
86. The section of the Judicial Conduct Act, establishing disciplinary procedures for federal 
judges, 28 U.S.C. § 372(b)(6)(B) (1982), explicitly divests the Judicial Councils of any removal 
powers. See note 242 infra. 
Although the Ninth Circuit, in Claiborne's appeal, extensively cites legislative history of the 
Judicial Conduct Act indicating Congress recognized that "federal judges, like other people, arc 
subject to criminal prosecution for their misdeeds," United States v. Claiborne, 727 F.2d 842, 
846 & n.5 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 829 (1984), the court's interpretation has two impor-
tant flaws. First, as noted in the text following note 229 infra, this analysis does not resolve the 
constitutional question as to when judges may be prosecuted - before or after impeachment. 
Second, and more to the court's point, even if the legislative history expressly approved a se-
quence anticipating the criminal process first, this alone certainly would not render the congres-
sional action constitutional. It is beyond reproach that "the constitution is superior to any 
ordinary act of the legislature." Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 178 (1803). 
87. See Hastings v. Judicial Conference of the United States, 829 F.2d 91, 101-03 (D.C. Cir. 
1987). 
88. THE FEDERALIST No. 79, at 550 (A. Hamilton) (H. Dawson ed. 1863). 
89. "[No] clause in the Constitution is intended to be without effect." Marbury v. Madison, 
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 174; Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 571 (1840). 
90. All judicial removal clauses of the Constitution are reproduced in notes 7 & 14 supra. 
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law.91 Furthermore, opponents argue, the Framers' silence as to other 
procedures could be explained by their desire to keep the document 
generalized. Silence conclusively establishes neither original disap-
proval of unanticipated developments nor original rejection of 
alternatives. 
However, other indications throughout the Constitution suggest 
that the Framers assumed impeachment would be the only judicial 
removal procedure. For example, article I, section 3, clause 7 pro-
vides that "[T]he Party convicted [of impeachment] shall nevertheless 
be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgement and Punishment, 
according to Law."92 The "party convicted" language arguably pre-
supposes that any disruption of an article III judge's tenure will occur 
first through impeachment and only subsequently through ordinary 
criminal prosecution; otherwise, the past tense used - one could read 
"party already convicted," or "a party that has just been convicted" 
- would have no meaning.93 
In fact, as Justice Story pointed out long ago,94 the reason for the 
Framers' inclusion of the "Party convicted" clause in the Constitution 
may have been only "to preclude the argument that the doctrine of 
double jeopardy saves the offender from [a] second trial."95 Still, it 
would be difficult to deny that the reference to impeachment first indi-
cates that the Framers presumed it would have preceded criminal 
proceedings. 
The reasons the Framers structured the impeachment power as 
they did become clear when contrasting the impeachment provisions 
against the Constitution's provisions for removal of Members of Con-
gress. Members of Congress are not subject to impeachment, but only 
to expulsion by their peers.96 They may be indicted and tried in crimi-
nal courts before they are expelled from Congress,97 but they are pro-
91. See, e.g., United States v. Barnes, 222 U.S. 513, 519 (1912); cf. Jarecki v. G.D. Searle & 
Co., 367 U.S. 303, 306-07 (1961). 
92. See note 7 supra. 
93. This argument was made by Judges Claiborne, Hastings, and Kerner in their defenses. 
United States v. Claiborne, 727 F.2d 842, 845-46 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 829 (1984); 
United States v. Hastings, 681 F.2d 706, 710 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1203 (1983); 
United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124, 1142 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974). 
94. 1 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 782 
(5th ed. 1905). 
95. Berger, The President, Congress, and the Courts, 83 YALE L.J. 1111, 1124 (1974) (quot-
ing then-Solicitor General Robert Bork). 
96. The Senate's 1797 finding that it did not have jurisdiction to impeach Senator William 
Blount for conspiracy, see F. WHARTON, STATE TRIALS OF THE UNITED STATES DURING THE 
ADMINISTRATIONS OF WASHINGTON AND ADAMS 315-17 (1849), has not been challenged. This 
decision has been construed to mean that a Senator is not an impeachable "civil officer" under 
art. II, § 4. See, e.g., P.C. HOFFER & N.E.H. HULL, supra note 68, at 156-57; R. BERGER, supra 
note 12, at 214-15; Feerick, supra note 47, at 25-26. 
97. United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501 (1972); United States v. Diggs, 613 F.2d 988 
(D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 982 (1980). 
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tected by other privileges not available to the judiciary, such as the 
speech and debate clause.98 
These different protections are logical when one considers that 
Members of Congress, unlike article III judges, are overtly political 
officials. Their ability to make public statements and to have un-
restricted access to legislative sessions requires protection, whereas 
"apolitical" article III judges instead require protection of their impar-
tiality. Thus, Members' protections go to the exercise of political of-
fice, while it is held, through provisions guarding their speech and 
debate in Congress. Protecting the retention of their offices, which are 
periodically challenged anyway, would be foolish.99 Meanwhile, 
judges require unfettered exercise of their judgments, through provi-
sions making their removal extremely difficult. 100 If it were easy to 
remove federal judges, their removal could be triggered by an unpopu-
lar decision, resulting in a judiciary by majority rule. 
This need for judicial protection also explains why the Constitu-
tion grants impeachment powers to Congress. Because legislative 
power is diffused among its many members, the legislature is theoreti-
cally the branch of government best able to winnow out frivolous 
charges against judges. 101 The Constitution therefore mandates that 
the judiciary answer only to the legislature upon misbehavior, rather 
than to the executive branch or other members of its own branch. 
It may be true that "[t]he question whether the impeachment 
power is exclusive cannot be resolved by scholarship" and "an author-
itative resolution can come only from the Supreme Court."102 How-
ever, as the next section shows, the "verdict of history" requiring 
impeachment to remove a federal judge did not develop in a vacuum; 
it was a direct response to the Framers' perceived need for an in-
dependent judiciary. 
B. Original Intent 
1. Judicial Independence 
Scrutinizing original intent may no longer be entirely in vogue in 
98. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. I provides, 
The Senators and Representatives ... shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach 
of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at the Session of their re-
spective Houses, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any Speech or Debate 
in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other Place. 
99. There are, of course, set procedures to be followed when removing Members of Congress. 
Cf. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969). 
100. See generally Part H.B. I infra. 
IOI. See notes 131-34 infra and accompanying text. But see notes 135 & 184 infra and ac-
companying text (the legislature's "intrinsic checks" are not real). 
102. Stolz, Disciplining Federal Judges: Is Impeachment Hopeless?, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 659, 
663 (1969). 
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constitutional analysis. 103 However, the Framers' approach is relevant 
here because, unlike many areas of current constitutional controversy, 
the underlying rationales of the judicial impeachment provisions -
separation of powers and judicial independence - have not changed 
over time. 104 Even the Seventh Circuit, which was the first court to 
announce that prosecution-before-impeachment was constitutional, 105 
spent the better part of a decision less than a decade later exalting 
judicial independence.106 Since the framework has not changed, the 
constitutional history sheds light on the meaning of the vague text. 
The debates at the Constitutional Convention make clear that the 
Framers' primary goal for the judiciary was to preserve its indepen-
dence.107 The importance of this objective traces back to the colonists' 
resentment of the iron-fisted monarchical control of the judges in Eng-
land. This is evidenced by one of the principal grievances recited in 
The Declaration of Independence: King George had "made judges 
dependent upon his will alone for the tenure of their offices and the 
amount and payment of their salaries. " 108 The colonists' dissatisfac-
tion with the English system led them to adopt only those provisions 
which promulgated the ideal of judicial autonomy. 109 
The Federalist Nos. 78 and 79 explain the Constitution's vision of 
judicial tenure and autonomy.110 Noting that the judiciary is the least 
103. See, e.g., Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885 
(1985); Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Princi-
ples, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781, 793-97 (1983); Levinson, Law as Literature, 60 TEXAS L. REV. 373, 
378 (1982); Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 469, 482-97 (1981). 
104. These rationales are nearly universally extolled by politicians and judges as well as 
scholars. See, e.g., [Georgia Senator Sam] Nunn, supra note 8; [then-North Carolina Senator 
Sam J.] Ervin, supra note 12; [then-D.C. Circuit Judge Antonin] Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing 
as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881 (1983); [Justice 
John Paul] Stevens, Reflections on the Removal of Sitting Judges, 13 STETSON L. REV. 215 
(1984). 
105. See United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974). 
106. See Geras v. Lafayette Display Fixtures, Inc., 742 F.2d 1037 (7th Cir. 1984). 
107. See l M. FARRAND, supra note 1, at 119, 120, 124; 2 id. at 34-36, 41-45, 73-83, 550-52. 
A proposal that judges be removable "by the Executive on the application [of] the Senate and 
House of Representatives" was voted down on the grounds that it "weaken[ed] too much the 
independence of the Judges." 2 id. at 428-29. Removal "by address" was also specifically de-
feated. Id. See also notes 70-72 supra and accompanying text. 
The elaborate impeachment provisions are not the only constitutional manifestations of the 
judiciary's armor against interference. Art. III, § I, cl. 2 also guarantees that "[t]he Judges, both 
of the supreme and inferior Courts ... shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Com-
pensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office." As explained by 
Alexander Hamilton, "Next to permanency in office, nothing can contribute more to the inde-
pendence of the Judges, than a fixed provision for their support." THE FEDERALIST No. 79, at 
548 (A. Hamilton) (H. Dawson ed. 1863). 
108. See w. CARPENTER, JUDICIAL TENURE IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (1913). See gener-
ally Stevens, supra note 104, at 220 ("[T]he long run advantages of an independent judiciary 
outweighed the political advantage of giving the prevailing majority practical control over the 
destiny of judicial officers."). 
109. See notes 70-72 supra and accompanying text. 
110. See notes 7 & 14 supra. 
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potent of the three branches of government, 111 Alexander Hamilton 
explained, 
[The judiciary] is in continual jeopardy of being overpowered, awed, or 
influenced by its coordinate branches; and that as nothing can contribute 
so much to its firmness and independence as permanency in office, this 
quality ... [is] an indispensable ingredient in [the] constitution .... 
The complete independence of the Courts of justice is ... essential 
112 
Given this basic premise, the ambiguous textual language113 must 
have been intended to make impeachment the exclusive means of dis-
qualifying misbehaving judges from retaining their duties. The cum-
bersome process 114 protects judges from the political backlash of their 
decisions. If there were an easier alternative removal method, im-
peachment would never be practiced, and judges would be unpro-
tected. The policy which brought about the impeachment provision 
thus presupposes its exclusivity for judges. If criminal proceedings are 
called for, they will certainly take place after the judge is impeached, 
when she is therefore no longer a judge, but an ordinary (unprotected) 
citizen. 
This argument raises an important point which merits elaboration. 
Designating impeachment an "exclusive" remedy for disciplining fed-
eral judges does not mean that an individual who happens to be a 
federal judge is immune from normal criminal punishment. All it does 
mean is that, while the individual retains her office, impeachment is 
the only disciplinary option available. After she is stripped of her du-
ties through an impeachment conviction, she will clearly "nevertheless 
be liable" to criminal prosecution. 115 Thus, calling impeachment an 
"exclusive" remedy is somewhat misleading in that it is only accurate 
when thinking about judges as judges, not as private citizens once they 
are no longer in office. A more precise description, then, would be 
that the needs of judicial independence require an "impeachment 
first," not an "impeachment only" standard. 
The Framers' recognition of the need to protect the judiciary's in-
dependence was all too accurate. Today's judges frequently find that 
111. "(T]he Judiciary, from the nature of its functions, will always be the least dangerous to 
the political rights of the Constitution; because it will be least in a capacity to annoy or 
injure them. The Executive not only dispenses the honors, but holds the sword of the com· 
munity. The Legislature not only commands the purse, but prescribes the rules by which 
the duties and rights of every citizen are to be regulated. The Judiciary, on the contrary, has 
no influence over either the sword or the purse .... " 
THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 539.40 (A. Hamilton) (H. Dawson ed. 1863). 
112. Id. at 540-41 (emphasis added). 
113. See Part II.A supra. 
114. As described by Lord Bryce, "Impeachment ... is the heaviest piece of artillery in the 
congressional arsenal, but because it is so heavy it is unfit for ordinary use. It ..• needs complex 
machinery to bring it into position, an enormous charge of powder to fire it, and a large mark to 
aim at." J. BRYCE, THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH 208 (1891). 
115. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 7. 
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they have to cope with "dramatic litigation in which [they find them-
selves] confronted with the need to decide an explosive issue" and the 
attendant "risk[s] of unpopularity."116 The Constitution's complex 
impeachment design, and its requirement of a two-thirds majority of 
the Senate for conviction, ultimately protects citizens by ensuring their 
judges do not make political decisions in order to preserve their own 
tenure in office. This is as important today as it was when the consti-
tutional language was drafted. 
This policy of judicial independence is risky because of its all-too-
easy disintegration into judicial mayhem. Not only is the policy 
highly exploitable by unscrupulous judges, but there is also a trouble-
some inadequacy regarding the removal of intellectually, but not mor-
ally, disabled judges. The Constitution's drafters were aware of the 
risks of complicating judicial removal, but they saw the approach as 
the least subject to abuse among their alternatives. As Hamilton put 
it, 
The want of a provision for removing the Judges on account of inability, 
has been a subject of complaint. But all considerate men will be sensible, 
that such a provision would either not be practised upon, or would be 
more liable to abuse, than calculated to answer any good purpose .... 
An attempt to fix the boundary between the regions of ability and inabil-
ity, would much oftener give scope to personal and party attachments 
and enmities, than advance the interests of justice, or the public good. 
The result, except in the case of insanity, must for the most part be arbi-
trary; and insanity, without any formal or express provision, may be 
safely pronounced to be a virtual disqualification. 117 
The Framers thus anticipated more danger of abuse from politick-
ing than from impediments to removing incompetent judges. This as-
sumption is empirically supported by the fact that a third of those 
threatened with impeachment have resigned (rather than suffer the en-
tire process), and an "undetermined number ... resigned upon mere 
threat of inquiry."118 Fundamentally, the Framers seem to have de-
cided that, despite hazards, any other rule would encourage the polit-
ical manipulation to which Claiborne claims he was subjected. 119 
The potential problem of corruption in the judiciary is more diffi-
116. Stevens, supra note 104, at 218. 
117. THE FEDERALIST No. 79, at 550 (A. Hamilton) (H. Dawson ed. 1863). It has been 
argued that Hamilton's reference to insanity being a "virtual disqualification" implies that "he 
must have believed that an insane judge could be removed from the bench other than by im· 
peachment." Note, The Chandler Incident, supra note 67, at 463. However, it is equally con-
ceivable that Hamilton believed that an insane judge would either be "physically unable to sit in 
his official capacity," id. at 464, or, more likely, that insanity would clearly be grounds for 
impeachment. 
118. J. BORKIN, supra note 15, at 204. See notes 44-45 supra and accompanying text. But 
see Stolz, supra note 102, at 667 (pointing out that the threat of impeachment itself may be a 
coercive weapon, since there are many potential reasons for resignations besides guilt, e.g.. the 
fact that the "impeachment procedure does not look fair"). 
119. See note 200 infra. 
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cult than that of incompetency. One valid criticism of the impeach-
ment process envisions dishonest judges exploiting the impracticability 
of their removal. 120 Judges Claiborne, Hastings, and Nixon may be 
examples of this phenomenon. Even more troubling is the potential 
horror of the judge who commits a violent crime: there may be 
problems ensuring the defendant's speedy trial.121 
However, these concerns must be weighed against the "long run 
advantages of an independentjudiciary."122 Where one draws the line 
demarcating "enough" and "too much" judicial independence turns 
largely on one's view of the honesty of the judiciary. If one believes, as 
does Justice Stevens, that "virtually all of [the life-tenured federal 
judges] are rendering judicial service that is entitled to the highest re-
spect,"123 then one is likely comfortable with the odds of the Framer's 
gamble.124 They apparently felt that the overall benefits of ensuring an 
independent judiciary outweighed the possibility of requiring ex-
traordinary steps, and extra time, to oust the rare miscreant. Even if 
one believes that judicial corruption will be far more frequent than 
Justice Stevens supposes, the objective of an independent judiciary 
may still prevail, because, as noted, impeachment never immunizes the 
individual from criminal proceedings.125 Requiring an impeachment-
first approach costs society only a delay of the criminal proceedings, 126 
whereas the price of a prosecution-first standard could be to under-
mine completely the protections from political coercion afforded 
judges by the impeachment process. One could imagine a new Presi-
dent from one political party summarily disposing of the judicial ap-
pointments of her predecessor (from the other political party) by 
employing the Justice Department to find and bring criminal charges 
against judges. Ultimately, the Framers decided that it was worth the 
cost of delaying valid criminal proceedings to avoid the higher costs 
associated with the filing of frivolous ones. 
120. See notes 159-61 infra and accompanying text. 
121. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public 
trial .... " U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
122. Stevens, supra note 104, at 220. 
123. Id. 
124. It has been persuasively argued that judges, de facto, are obliged to live up to more 
stringent standard of conduct than others, both on and off the bench. Kaufman, Chilli11g I11de-
pende11ce, supra note 50, at 706-12 (arguing that the extraordinary screening procedures judges 
undergo before qualifying for judicial appointment, as well as the peer pressure from other judges 
while in office, guard against judicial abuse of trust). See ge11erally Part 11.B.3 infra: MODEL 
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1972). 
125. See text at note 115 supra. 
126. In the fictional extreme case in which a judge committed a crime, such as mass murder, 
where society's safety mandated her immediate incarceration, common sense would dictate that 
public safety considerations would overwhelm procedural ones and thus allow her confinement 
until an undoubtedly hurried Congress could impeach her. 
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2. Separation of Powers 
The issue underlying judicial independence is the separation of 
powers doctrine. 127 The impeachment provisions are an exercise in 
the careful balancing of powers. It provided a way to remove judges, 
because their absolute independence would have been open to abuse. 
But it protected the judiciary, which was clearly vulnerable to having 
its operations disrupted by the other branches of government. In addi-
tion to the potential for coercion of judicial decisionmaking, 12s judicial 
stability required protection from the political winds of change. Put 
another way, the Framers wanted to preclude each new President 
from summarily dismissing his predecessors' judges and appointing his 
own. 129 Given this goal, effectively vesting removal powers in Depart-
ment of Justice prosecutors may be the very worst choice; yet the pros-
ecution-first standard does just that. 130 
The Framers chose a pragmatic compromise by vesting removal 
responsibilities in Congress. Although the Senate is criticized today as 
too large to make just decisions131 and overwhelmingly disinterested in 
the impeachment process (rendering attendance at impeachment trials 
abysmal), 132 Congress is the only governmental branch with any in-
trinsic checks on frivolous or vindictive accusations. Unlike other 
branches, the legislature's power does not rest in the hands of one indi-
vidual, but is diffused across a large, representative body. 133 Even if 
bad faith charges were filed by one Member of Congress, other Mem-
bers' votes would theoretically blunt their impact, either through re-
jection of the charges or through failure to obtain the two-thirds 
Senate majority needed for conviction. 
Furthermore, the argument goes, impeachment is a high profile 
process. Once charges are filed, investigation of their validity and the 
127. At least five of The Federalist papers, Nos. 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, were devoted to demon-
strating that the separation of powers principle was adequately preserved in the Constitution. In 
No. 47, James Madison observed of the separation of powers doctrine, "No political truth is 
certainly of greater intrinsic value, or is stamped with the authority of more enlightened patrons 
of liberty." THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 334 (J. Madison) (H. Dawson ed. 1863). See generally 
Kurland, The Rise and Fall of the ''Doctrine" of Separation of Powers, 85 MICH. L. REV. 592 
(1986). 
128. See notes 111-16 supra and accompanying text. 
129. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 540 (A. Hamilton) (H. Dawson ed. 1863) (the judicial 
branch is "in continual jeopardy of being overpowered" by the other branches of government). 
130. Though alluded to here, the issue of prosecutorial discretion is beyond the reach of this 
Note. See generally K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY (1969); 
Kaplan, The Prosecutorial Discretion - A Comment, 60 Nw. U. L. REV. 174 (1965); Frampton, 
Prosecuting Public Officials, 36 Mo. L. REV. 5 (1976). 
131. See note 13 supra; Comment, Removal, supra note 80, at 1389. 
132. See Comment, Removal, supra note 80, at 1389; Will Claiborne's Impeachment Spur 
Overhaul of Process?, Natl. L.J., Oct. 20, 1986, at 8, col. 1 (nearly a third of the Senators "never 
heard a word of the testimony"). 
133. Kaufman, Chilling Independence, supra note 50, at 708 ("The federal legislature ... is 
not hierarchical .... "). 
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trials themselves consume a disproportionate block of scarce Senate 
time. Because Members of Congress continually face reelection con-
tests, and negotiate with other Members, no self-preserving Represen-
tative would introduce charges unless she were thoroughly convinced 
of their legitimacy. 134 Of course, there is often political hay to be 
made through the filing of impeachment charges. 135 Yet neither the 
executive nor the judicial branch features the dispersion of power 
among many members that distinguishes the legislature. Thus, while 
no governmental branch staffed by human beings is politically infalli-
ble, the legislature retains an intrinsic check against abuse that does 
not exist in either of the other branches. 
3. Protection of the Office 
Having said all this, one point must be clarified. It is somewhat 
inappropriate to be discussing the Framers' intent regarding judicial 
impeachment. While, as discussed, the original vision of the tenure of 
the judiciary and its "political" role vis-a-vis the other branches of 
government were debated at length, judicial removal was not of major 
concern to the Framers. 136 The impeachment debates at the Constitu-
tional Convention focused mainly on removal of the executive; the im-
peachment provisions were "intended" to check presidential, not 
judicial, activity .131 
This fact does not undermine the foregoing conclusions regarding 
the importance of judicial independence: Judicial tenure was decid-
edly for the life of the judge; therefore, any discussion of removal was 
superfluous. Nevertheless, further analysis of the intended meaning of 
the judicial impeachment clauses must be made by analogy to execu-
tive impeachment. 
Consider, for instance, an idea suggested by Max Farrand in The 
Framing of the Constitution of the United States: "[W]hat is perhaps 
the clearest indication of intention to make the office an important one 
is that the executive was rendered subject to impeachment."138 Far-
134. See Stolz, supra note 102, at 666-67. 
135. For example, then-Republican House Leader Gerald Ford's proposal to impeach Justice 
William O. Douglas, see R. BERGER, supra note 12, at 53, 86, 94, 123; Feerick, supra note 47, at 
2 & n.5, may be a high water mark in candidness regarding political motivations. Ford asserted 
at that time that an "impeacha.ble offense is whatever a majority of the House of Representatives 
considers it to be at a given moment in history," and that conviction results from those "offenses 
two-thirds of the other body considers to be sufficiently serious to require removal of the accused 
from office." 116 CONG. REC. 11913 (1970). In fact, Ford almost admitted that his impeach-
ment proposal was in retaliation for the Senate's consecutive rejection of two Nixon nominees to 
the Supreme Court. Id. at 11918. See also note 184 infra; Schoenbaum, supra note 71, at 5-6 
(regarding movement to impeach Chief Justice Earl Warren in the mid-1950s); ten Broek, supra 
note 67. 
136. See, e.g., Feerick, supra note 47, at 48; R. BERGER, supra note 12, at 146-47. 
137. R. BERGER, supra note 12, at 146-47. 
138. M. FARRAND, THE FRAMING Of THE CONSTITUTION Of THE UNITED STATES 79 
(1913) (emphasis added). 
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rand's statement points to an important underlying implication: 
somehow the office itself, rather than the person holding the office, 
required the protection of an impeachment provision. Although Far-
rand's point was not made in the context of judicial impeachment, this 
perceived need for office protection can also be found in the vague 
"good behavior" and "high crimes and misdemeanors" language, 
which has been construed to mean that an action need not be indicta-
ble to be impeachable. 139 The potential need to impeach for noncrimi-
nal deeds presupposes higher expectations for the conduct of those 
subject to impeachment than of the average citizen.140 Efficient gov-
ernment requires a mechanism for rejecting an individual occupying 
an office, whether the office is judicial or executive. 
Requiring a higher standard of conduct for officeholders is admit-
tedly a burden on the individual. The mere appearance of impropriety 
can lead to unemployment. 141 This argument can be countered, how-
ever, by the fact that it does not seem intuitively unfair to require 
those holding society's most responsible positions to meet higher stan-
dards commensurate with their privileges. 142 
Examining the reasons that the Framers chose to protect the office 
at the expense of the individual reinforces the assertion that they care-
fully chose impeachment as the sole judicial disciplinary method. The 
"protection of the office" idea assumes that the power of the judiciary 
139. See Ritter v. United States, 84 Ct. Cl. 293 (1936), cert. denied, 300 U.S. 668 (1937). See 
generally C. BLACK, supra note 67, at 33-40; ten Broek, supra note 67 (arguing that neither Judge 
Ritter nor Judge Archbald, supra note 44, were convicted on impeachment for indictable of-
fenses); R. BERGER, supra note 12, at 62; Fenton, The Scope of the Impeachment Power, 65 Nw. 
U. L. REV. 719, 731 (1970) (noncriminal misconduct was intended to be included "within the 
catalog of impeachable offenses"). 
140. Attesting to this is the development of the MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 
(1972). As Judge Irving Kaufman noted at the Second Circuit Judicial Conference, the Code 
asks judges to submit "to ethical dialogues rather than to penal directives." MacKay, The Judici-
ary and Non-Judicial Activities, 35 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9, 26 (1970). See also note 124 
supra. 
141. See generally Lubet, Judicial Ethics and Private Lives, 79 Nw. U. L. REV. 983 (1985) 
(describing the many noncriminal activities for which a judge may be disciplined). Although the 
defendant is protected by the necessary two-thirds Senate majority for conviction, the defendant 
does not enjoy customary judicial protections, such as due process, or the rules of evidence, or 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., 114 CONG. REC. 4558 (1968) (remarks of Sen. Tyd-
ings on introduction ofS.B. 3055); 87 CONG. REC. 8149-50 (1941) (debate on H.R. 146, remarks 
of Rep. Sumners); Stolz, supra note 102, at 667. Theoretically, a defendant may be impeached for 
simply soiling the office's good name. Yankwich, supra note SO, at 867. See generally ten Broek, 
supra note 67. 
142. [A] judge may be unfit who, without being guilty of any moral obliquity, does yet, ... 
by overlooking the fact that the office he occupies is not a private, personal, lifelong sine-
cure, but an institution established to achieve the needs of society for justice through law, 
fail to attain that high standard of "good behavior" which should be the ideal of the judge of 
an enlightened society. 
Yankwich, supra note 50, at 867. See also Benoit v. Gardner, 351 F.2d 846, 849 (1st Cir. 1965) 
("[T]hose appointed to high public office hold special public trust; they cannot properly complain 
if they are the objects of special scrutiny."); Rogers & Young, Public Office as a Public Trust: A 
Suggestion That Impeachment for High Crimes and Misdemeanors Implies a Fiduciary Standard, 
63 GEO. L.J. 1024 (1975). 
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rests, to a large degree, on the public's belief in its authority; as Hamil-
ton noted in The Federalist, the judiciary cannot rely on its control of 
the army (as the President can), nor of the purse (as the Legislature 
can). 143 The maintenance of this public confidence requires that the 
court's dignity, its limited time and energy, and its appearance of (and 
actual) impartiality be carefully guarded. None may be sacrificed 
without jeopardizing this indispensable public confidence. 144 
Impeachment furthers this end. Criminal prosecution of a sitting 
judge arguably soils the office as much as the individual. Preserving 
the integrity of the judiciary thus mandates that impeachment precede 
any other disciplinary proceedings. It serves to separate the person 
from the office, preserve the aura of the office, and, ultimately, pre-
serve the potency of the judicial branch. 
This observation helps to explain the curious irony extant when a 
provision developed to coerce better-than-average behavior is invoked 
to delay a criminal prosecution (as with Judges Claiborne and Nixon). 
Because the abuse of office was seen as doing damage to the office 
itself, impeachment was required as a separation technique. The office 
was too precious to be further sullied by being subjected to a criminal 
prosecution. Any delay in the prosecution of the individual was worth 
the overall benefit to the office. Impeachment could thus mitigate the 
damage done to the judiciary as a whole in the unfortunate situation of 
a miscreant judge. 
C. Modern Policy: The Short-Sighted Efficiency Argument 
The original ideals of preserving judicial independence and integ-
rity remain important today, 145 yet the challenges to these ideals have 
become more vigorous146 as the country, and its judicial workload, 
have grown. 147 Significantly, the most frequent modern challenge to 
143. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (A. Hamilton). But cf. Annals of Law, The Tenth Justice l 
NEW YORKER, Aug. 10, 1987, at 29; Scalia, A Note 011 the Benzene Case, REGULATION, July-
Aug. 1980, at 25, 28. 
144. Lubet, supra note 141, at 985-86. 
145. See note 104 supra. 
146. As Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr. wrote in 1970, 
To my mind, an independent judiciary is perhaps the most essential characteristic of a 
free society .... 
Unfortunately, the events of recent years have created an aura of crisis in many sectors 
of our society, and in their haste to set right situations deemed disastrous, leaders in all three 
branches of the government have proposed solutions ultimately inimical to the constitu-
tional safeguards so carefully formulated by the founding fathers. 
Ervin, supra note 12, at 121-22. 
147. For example, there were approximately 18,000 more cases filed in U.S. District Courts 
in 1977 than in 1972, for a total of 163,492 in 1977, with 169,698 pending at the end of that year. 
This was despite an overall decrease (by two judges) in the number of federal judgeships (exclud-
ing senior judges) from 1972 to 1977. Similarly, there were an additional 1000 cases filed in 
federal Circuit Courts each year during that five-year period, while the number of judges re-
mained constant - 97 judges (to handle over 19,000 cases in 1977). See U.S. ADMINISTRATIVE 
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, MANAGEMENT STATISTICS (1977). 
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the impeachment process is its inefficiency. 148 However, the efficiency 
argument fails to counter the original concerns that created the Con-
stitution's impeachment provisions. 
1. The Premise 
The argument operates from the premise that the constitutional 
standard is archaic: it did not anticipate today's plethora of federal 
judges.149 Pragmatically, proponents reason, it has become impossible 
for Congress to discipline each judge individually. There are over 750 
federal judges, 150 and every impeachment monopolizes weeks of lim-
ited congressional session time.15 I If any significant number ever re-
quired discipline, the legislature could become paralyzed.152 Perhaps 
more importantly, the consequence of this inefficiency is that inade-
quate judges can retain their positions simply because they are so diffi-
cult to remove. 153 
The efficiency proponents rationalize that while one judge may 
have merited this expenditure of congressional time when there were 
148. Today's scholarly criticisms focus mainly on the lack of care with which Senators hear 
the impeachments and the ineffectiveness of the process in ensuring an honest, competent judici-
ary. See note 132 supra and accompanying text. See also Note, The Chandler Incident, supra 
note 67; text at notes 159-61 infra. Evidence of political frustration with the procedure is found 
in the debates of the legislative proposals to modify or eliminate the procedure, see notes 50-51 
supra and accompanying text, and in current motions for modification, see notes 52-55 supra and 
accompanying text. 
149. See, e.g., Nunn, supra note 8, at 43-44; Impeachment of Judges: A 'Cumbersome Tool,' 
N.Y. Times, Apr. 2, 1986, at Al6, col. 3. See also notes 151-53 infra and accompanying text. 
150. See U.S. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, MANAGEMENT 
STATISTICS (1977). 
151. It takes sixteen to seventeen days to try an average impeachment in the Senate, 114 
CONG. REC. 4558 (1968) (introduction of S. 3055, remarks of Sen. Tydings); 87 CONG. REC. 
8149-50 (1941) {debate on H.R. 146), after the weeks of House of Representatives time needed to 
draft and approve articles of impeachment, see Nunn, supra note 8, at 30. 
152. Nunn argues that Congress is already far too busy with pressing matters to spend weeks 
impeaching one of today's "obscure, yet misbehaving judge[s]." Nunn, supra note 8, at 30. 
153. See notes 159-61 infra and accompanying text. In addition to the problems surrounding 
removal of misbehaving judges, efficiency proponents point to impeachment's ineffectiveness for 
removing judges for nonethical reasons, such as senility or incompetency. They argue that this 
may have been tolerable when Hamilton penned The Federalist, but society can no longer afford 
inefficacious judges. Besides, it would be ludicrous to subject an incapacitated judge to the hu-
miliation of an impeachment proceeding. 
This argument disregards the key question Hamilton addressed in The Federalist No. 79, see 
text at note 117 supra: Who decides when a judge is so disabled that she should be removed? 
The potential for arbitrary removal of judges by those trying to advance "personal and party 
attachments and enmities," id .. is the very dilemma that prompted the structuring of impeach-
ment provisions. See Part II.B supra. The Framers affirmatively chose to err on the side of 
potential inefficiency, for the greater good of an unthreatened judiciary. As for debilitated 
judges, there is already an easily invoked alternative to impeachment: they can resign. See J. 
BORKIN, supra note 15, at 204. Finally, the Judicial Conduct Act, supra note 50, gives the judici-
ary limited powers to deal with their disabled or miscreant colleagues short of removal, such as 
moving them to senior status. As long as these measures do not involuntarily deprive a judge of 
the essential duties which enable her to be a judge, they should pass constitutional muster. See, 
e.g., Hastings v. Judicial Conference of the United States, 829 F.2d 91, 101-03 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
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very few judges in the federal system, today's judges clearly do not.154 
The argument goes that since each individual judge no longer has the 
influence she did when there were fewer judges, the benefits of protect-
ing each judge's independence are diminished because of the limited 
impact of any one judge's decisions. 
This premise is flawed. First, the underlying notion that the Fram-
ers did not anticipate the effects of population growth is debatable. 
Although they did not specifically discuss this at the Constitutional 
Convention, 155 the Framers had enough foresight to build in flexibility 
for other variables related to the country's expansion, such as infla-
tion.156 In fact, as illustrated, the Framers intended impeachment to 
be inefficient, in order to maintain judicial stability and indepen-
dence.157 Fear of society's mutations may have actually been the impe-
tus of the constitutional impeachment provisions. 
Furthermore, the Constitution has accommodated growth in many 
other areas without the need to alter the document or its interpreta-
tion, because the principles underlying the language were deemed too 
valuable to abandon. For example, the constitutional procedure re-
garding the appointment of the expanded judiciary is rarely criti-
cized.15s It could be suggested that the President should not waste her 
scarce time appointing article III judges; or that the Senate should no 
longer be required to approve them; or that less than a two-thirds ma-
jority should be required for approval. Some constitutional "relics" 
endure because the policies that created them have not changed with 
time. Impeachment falls within this category. 
2. The Theory 
Even granting the premise of the efficiency argument, its theory 
remains questionable. By undervaluing such intangibles as the inde-
pendence and integrity of the judiciary, the argument avoids the most 
difficult conflicts. Consider the efficiency proponents' assertion that 
impeachment is no longer an effective deterrent to judges contemplat-
ing malpractice.159 They note that impeachment is so impractical that 
154. See Nunn, supra note 8, at 30-31. 
155. See text at note 136 supra. 
156. As Hamilton noted in The Federalist, the Constitutional Convention chose to compen· 
sate the judges "at stated times" and in such a way that the compensation "shall not be dimi11· 
ished during their continuance in office," (quoting U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1), in lieu of providing 
for "permanent" salaries, because "the fluctuations in the value of money, and in the state of a 
society, rendered a fixed rate of compensation in the Constitution inadmissible. What might be 
extravagant to-day, might in half a century be penurious and inadequate." THE FEDERALIST No. 
79, at 549 (A. Hamilton) (H. Dawson ed. 1863) (emphasis in original). 
157. See Part II.B supra. 
158. But see Shartel, Federal Judges - Appointme11t, Supervision, and Removal - Some 
Possibilities Under the Constitution, Part I: Judicial Appointment of District and Circuit Judges, 
28 MICH. L. REV. 485 (1930). 
159. This aspect of the efficiency argument seems to be an outgrowth of the frustration at the 
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it is only employed when demanded by the most egregious judicial 
sins. 160 Thus, they reason, Thomas Jefferson's celebrated description 
of impeachment as a "bungling way of removing Judges ... an im-
practicable thing- a mere scarecrow,"161 evinces the irony of blindly 
clinging to this archaic process: rather than designing our laws to in-
duce judges to maintain a higher standard of conduct than the average 
citizen, 162 we instead refuse to relinquish a procedure which effectively 
encourages federal judges to act illegally. Immunizing judges from 
criminal prosecution "is counterintuitive. It is fundamental to our 
system of justice that no one is above the law and that the guilty 
should be punished."163 
Here the efficiency argument misses the point. Defenders of the 
impeachment standard do not assert that the guilty need not be pun-
ished, only that punishment should be subsequent to impeachment in 
order to preserve a procedure that protects society's competing inter-
est in an independent judiciary. It may be true that impeachment is 
more difficult to achieve than a court conviction. This was, of course, 
intended to be so. However, once the judge is removed from office, she 
shall "be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Pun-
modest number of impeachments generated by the existing system. Yet the statistical analysis 
carries ambiguous implications. Although 59 may seem a paltry number of judges to be investi-
gated in national history, see notes 42-46 supra and accompanying text (and adding to Borkin's 
data the cases of Judges Kerner, Hastings, Claiborne, and Nixon), consider that 18 of the investi-
gated judges relinquished their offices through their own resignations. When added to 9 im-
peachments, this brings the total number of judges removed to 27, nearly half of those 
investigated. Moreover, 22 of the 59 investigated were specifically absolved of impeachable con-
duct. See J. BORKIN, supra note 15, at 204. The fact that there were few impeachments does not 
necessarily reflect the ease with which the judiciary can avoid discipline. Note that an "undeter-
mined" number of judges resigned upon the mere threat of inquiry. Id. The infrequency of 
impeachments thus could demonstrate either the effectiveness of the threat of impeachment, or 
even the integrity of the federal judiciary. In this context, 59 could arguably be seen as a large 
number of judges to be charged with violating their public trust. As Judge J. Clifford Wallace 
remarked before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on the Constitution, while defending the 
Judicial Councils' statistical record of activity in disciplining their judges: 
[T]he success of the procedure should not be measured by the number of actions the council 
is required to take against judges in a given year. The process is working at its best when 
problem judges are corrected in a quiet and efficient manner. The problem is solved and a 
good judge is saved. There may not be a headline, but that should not be the mark of 
success. 
Judge Wallace statement, supra note 58, at 12. 
160. See note 114 supra ("Impeachment ... is so heavy it is unfit for ordinary use."). 
161. See I c. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 295 (1922). 
While this Jefferson quote is catchy and famous, it was motivated by a specific factual setting, 
namely Jefferson's political desire to remove Federalists from the federal bench. See generally 
P.C. HOFFER & N.E.H. HULL, supra note 68, at 70-75. In fact, before his Presidency, Jefferson 
supported the protection of the independence of the judiciary. Kurland, supra note 12, at 694. 
Notably, Jefferson "did think it necessary to resort to constitutional, not merely legislative, 
changes to effect his objectives." Id. at 695. 
162. See notes 124 & 140-41 supra and accompanying text. 
163. United States v. Claiborne, 790 F.2d 1355, 1359 (9th Cir. 1986) (Kozinski, J., 
dissenting). 
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ishment, according to Law."164 
This is not the only area in which our justice system recognizes 
that competing values demand special procedures as protective excep-
tions to standard operating procedures. These constitutional protec-
tions enable the government to "put a thumb on the scale" on behalf 
of public policy interests not otherwise adequately weighed. Judge 
Kozinski, in his dissent from the Ninth Circuit's denial of a stay of 
Judge Claiborne's sentence, aptly expressed this idea: 
[Although Judge Claiborne's claim of immunity] is counterintuitive ... 
these principles are not absolute. For example, . . . the Constitution 
gives Senators and Representatives immunity "for any Speech or Debate 
in either House." And, on occasion, the prejudicial effect of evidence 
obtained in violation of a defendant's constitutional rights is so serious 
that a conviction must be overturned. These results, and numerous 
others like them, may offend our sense of justice, but they are thought to 
serve a purpose higher than the exigencies of a particular case. The last 
two centuries of constitutional adjudication should have taught us that 
intuition is no substitute for legal reasoning .... 165 
Keeping in mind that Judge Claiborne's "counterintuitive" claim only 
delays his criminal prosecution, this seems a small price to pay for the 
constitutional protection of the entire judiciary. The efficiency argu-
ment defines its way around this problem by virtually stipulating that 
an independent judiciary is less valuable than an efficient society. 
Analysis is superfluous after this initial assignation of values. 
3. The Manifestations 
The two proposed constitutional amendments that have been the 
focus of recent Senate attention166 crystallize the efficiency propo-
nents' reaction to the Claiborne case.167 As noted, legislative propos-
als to expedite the impeachment process are not novel in the face of 
alleged judicial improprieties.168 These concrete manifestations, like 
the abstract efficiency argument which underpins them, neglect signifi-
164. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 7. 
165. Claiborne, 790 F.2d at 1357 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, 
cl. I) (emphasis added). In addition to the speech and debate clause mentioned by Judge Kozin-
ski, the Constitution has been interpreted to grant the president immunity from judicial process 
for official acts, Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475 (1867), but not to grant absolute 
immunity to all presidential documents from subpoena, United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 
(1973); Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Services, 433 U.S. 425 (1977). Judges are absolutely 
immune from civil suit for official judicial functions or acts. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 
355-57 (1978); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967). But cf. Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522 
(1984) (limiting immunity). Judicial immunity extends to prosecutors for official acts as well. 
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976). For an extensive compilation of the ways in which 
American law has seen fit to grant constitutional, statutory, and common-law privileges and 
immunities, see Burke, Privileges and Immunities in American Law, 31 S.D. L. Rev. 1 (1985). 
166. See notes 54-55 supra and accompanying text. 
167. See text at notes 56-57 supra. 
168. See note 50 supra and accompanying text. 
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cant policy concerns in their attempt to respond rapidly to immediate 
political pressures.169 
The Subcommittee on the Constitution of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee held a hearing on the amendments170 in which two wit-
nesses testified, Ninth Circuit Judge J. Clifford Wallace and University 
of Pennsylvania Law Professor Stephen B. Burbank. 171 Both were 
highly critical of the amendments, focusing primarily on the fact that 
the current impeachment procedures are adequate to deal with the 
rare unlawful judge.172 They suggested that modification of the con-
gressional impeachment rules could expedite the process somewhat, 
without sacrificing constitutional intent. 173 The two witnesses pointed 
to numerous substantive areas in which the proposed amendments ne-
glected "fundamental principles" the Constitution seeks to protect.174 
Not surprisingly, violation of the principles of judicial independence 
and the separation of powers was of particular concern. 175 
Proponents of the efficiency argument sometimes compare federal 
impeachment procedures to state judicial removal procedures in order 
to illustrate the benefits of a more efficient system. Since 1960, nearly 
every state has broken from the traditional federal impeachment 
model and has enacted rules (either by statute or constitutional 
amendment) which create advisory commissions on judicial qualifica-
tions to investigate allegations of judicial misconduct. 176 While no 
169. Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr., who served as Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Subcommit-
tee on Separation of Powers during the period that S.B. 1506, supra note 50, was debated, voiced 
the same problems with that bill that are troublesome with today's amendments: 
[I]t is not surprising that some deeply concerned persons would emulate the example of 
Sampson, who, in his blind zeal, destroyed the pillars on which the temple rested .... In 
many instances these [proposals to restrict federal judges] represent a direct assault upon the 
principle of judicial independence. 
Ervin, supra note 12, at 122. 
170. See note 53 supra and accompanying text. 
171. Witness List of the Hearing on S.J. Res. 364 and S.J. Res. 370 Before the Subcomm. on 
the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (Aug. 12, 1986) 
(unpublished) (on file with the Michigan Law Review). 
172. Professor Burbank statement, supra note 58, at 1-2. 
173. Judge Wallace statement, supra note 58, at 6-8; Professor Burbank statement, supra 
note 58, at 3-7. For a description of proposed changes in Senate rules, see note 52 supra. 
174. Judge Wallace statement, supra note 58, at 3. 
175. Judge Wallace statement, supra note 58, at 8-10; Professor Burbank statement, supra 
note 58, at 8, 10. These were not the only substantive areas in which the language of the pro-
posed amendments was found dangerous. Judge Wallace criticized the overinclusive wording of 
the amendment and its potential due process violations. Judge Wallace statement, supra note 58, 
at 4. He focused on the discussed problem of defining "high crimes and misdemeanors," supra 
note 67, noting that not all felonies are so serious that they should automatically mandate forfei-
ture of office (for example, destruction of a mailbox, 18 U.S.C. § 1705 (1982); or adultery, IDAHO 
CODE § 18-6601 (1987)). Judge Wallace statement, supra note 58, at 4. Furthermore, he saw 
significant potential for abuse in the amendments' absolutist, inflexible language ("automatic re-
moval after direct appeal [is] completed"). Judge Wallace statement, supra note 58, at 3, 9-JO 
(emphasis added). 
176. See Brooks, Penalizing Judges Who Appeal Disciplinary Sanctions: The Unconstitution-
ality of"Upping the Ante," 69 JUDICATURE 95, 95-96 (Aug.-Sept. 1985). For a compilation and 
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state commission's power extends as far to actual removal of a judge 
from office, their recommendations to their state's removal body (usu-
ally the state supreme court) carry enormous weight. 177 The federal 
judicial system, it is suggested, would benefit from an expansion of 
Judicial Council influence to match that of the state commissions. 178 
However, the alternative removal provisions used by states such as 
recall, executive action, election, bar association action, and judicial 
action 179 are subject to the selfsame political influences from which the 
Framers sought to protect the federal judiciary.180 These state provi-
sions sacrifice judicial independence, 181 which is clearly not as impor-
tant to the states as it was to the writers of the federal Constitution. 
Indications of this are sprinkled throughout state constitutions: wit-
ness the fact that most state judges are appointed for terms and/or 
must periodically stand for reelection.1s2 
A final argument corollary to the efficiency argument denounces 
the impeachment process as too political. 183 This approach charges 
that impeachment's cumbersome inefficiency does not even achieve the 
desired result of preventing political attacks on the judiciary. Thus, 
attacks on the efficiency argument overvalue impeachment's purported 
benefits, because impeachment actually does not protect judges from 
politics. This argument points to the fact that impeachment proceed-
ings are often brought for political reasons, 184 and the legislature is 
undeniably prone to political whims, despite intrinsic checks against 
abuse through its diffused power structure.1s5 
categorization of alternative judicial removal procedures, see Schoenbaum, supra note 71. These 
state commissions serve similar functions to the advisory and oversight role established for the 
Judicial Councils under the provisions of the federal Judicial Conduct Act. See note 50 supra. 
177. See Brooks, supra note 176, at 96. 
178. See, e.g., Schoenbaum, supra note 71. 
179. Id. at 1-19. Some jurisdictions go so far as to make removal from office a consequence 
of criminal conviction for certain crimes. See, e.g., TENN. CooE ANN.§ 39-5-401 (1982); N.C. 
GEN. STAT. §§ 14-228 to -230 (1981). 
180. See Part 11.B supra. Some of the state procedures, such as "address" and periodic elec-
tion, were specifically rejected by the Framers as intrusive into judicial branch autonomy. See 
notes 107 supra. 
181. See Brooks, supra note 176, at 97. 
182. See Note, Safeguarding the Litigant's Constitutional Right to a Fair and Impartial Fo-
rum: A Due Process Approach to Improprieties Arising from Judicial Campaign Contributions 
from Lawyers, 86 MICH. L. REV. 382, 382 & n.3 (1987). 
183. See, e.g., Stolz, supra note 102, at 666; Comment, supra note 50, at 1064 n.5; ten Brock, 
supra note 67, at 185. 
184. See note 135 supra and accompanying text. As noted by then-Vice President Jefferson, 
"history shows, that in England, impeachment has been an engine more of passion than of jus-
tice." R. BERGER, supra note 12, at 79 n.130. Jefferson's criticism is somewhat ironic, because as 
President, Jefferson himself used impeachment as a weapon to try to remove Federalists from the 
courts, beginning with the unsuccessful impeachment of Associate Justice Samuel Chase in 1804. 
See generally P.C. HOFFER & N.E.H. HULL, supra note 68, at 70-75, 231; Kurland, supra note 
12, at 694-95; Stolz, supra note 102, at 666. 
185. See note 133 supra and accompanying text. 
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Critics of impeachment on this basis would be more helpful if they 
could suggest less political alternatives. Suggestions either focus on 
modification of the existing legislative impeachment proceedings so as 
to minimize the political nature of the process, 186 or on shifting re-
moval power to a judicial tribunal. 187 
Calls for revision of the House and Senate rules do not raise consti-
tutional difficulties, because they implicitly accept the existing machin-
ery. In fact, the only Senate procedural innovation rejected during 
Judge Claiborne's impeachment arguably was spurned because it stim-
ulated the same constitutional problems as the proposed amendments. 
The innovation in question was the third article of impeachment, 
which allowed for impeachment conviction solely on the basis of the 
criminal conviction. Commenting on this article's 46 to 17 defeat, 
Senator Alan J. Dixon remarked that many Senators did not want "to 
set the precedent that a conviction would be equivalent to impeach-
ment."188 Other modernizations of existing procedures have been sug-
gested, including creation of a bipartisan House Committee on 
Judicial Fitness, with a permanent professfonal staff; and the use of 
special masters to conduct evidentiary hearings for the Senate. 189 
These alterations may in fact help depoliticize the process, and they do 
not do violence to the ideal of judicial independence. 
Calling for the judiciary to remove its own members is another 
matter, because the suggestion assumes that the judiciary will some-
how be less susceptible to political motivations than the legislature. 
This assumption is not clearly valid. First, judges may hold biases 
because a defendant judge tarnishes the judiciary as a whole. This 
problem is partially dealt with through judges' ability to recuse them-
selves from cases in which they feel they could not be impartial, 190 but 
there is arguably no judge in the federal system who could adjudicate 
another judge's trial without struggling with objectivity. Conversely, 
the stature of Senators' offices is not diminished by the defendant 
judge. 
Furthermore, suggestions for judicial tribunals invariably call for 
the tribunal members to be appointed_ by the Chief Justice of the 
United States.191 Putting aside the potential for intrusion of the execu-
tive branch into these selections (and therefore the tribunal deci-
186. Stolz, supra note 102, at 667-70. 
187. E.g., Nunn, supra note 8; Comment, supra note 50 (advocating adoption of then-pend-
ing S.B. 1506). · 
188. Senate Convicts Judge of 'High Crimes,' Wash. Post, Oct. 10, 1986, at Al, col. 3. See 
also note 26 supra. 
189. Stolz, supra note 102, at 667-70. 
190. See 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1982). 
191. Comment, supra note 50, at 1072; Nunn, supra note 8; see also· notes 50-51 supra 
(describing prior legislative proposals). 
454 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 86:420 
sions), 192 the abstract notion of vesting all judicial removal decisions in 
a small panel of judges, each one appointed by the same person, is, to 
understate the case, politically charged. Under these proposals, the 
Chief Justice could wield more power over the makeup of the federal 
judiciary than the President, who selects judicial nominees. In con-
trast, vesting removal power in the power-diffused Congress, and re-
quiring a two-thirds majority to convict, softens the impact of any one 
person. 193 Obviously, not all frivolous or vindictive accusations will 
be stopped in the Legislature, but it is the only branch in which these 
checks are possible. Although giving impeachment powers to the leg-
islature is not a panacea, it is the best option available. 
4. Summary 
The overall inadequacy of the efficiency argument is perhaps best 
made in D.C. Circuit Judge Harry Edwards' concurrence in Hastings 
v. Judicial Conference of the United States: 
The fact that, in practice, impeachment may be so difficult that unwor-
thy judges are not often removed from office does not give either Con-
gress or the judiciary license to fashion an alternative, more efficient 
method of dealing with the problem. "Convenience and efficiency are not 
the primary objectives - or the hallmarks - of democratic 
government."194 
The "primary objectives" that justify maintenance of complex im-
peachment machinery are concerns of judicial independence and sepa-
ration of powers. Due to its unsure foundation in premise and policy, 
the efficiency argument does not acceptably respond to these concerns. 
The drive to prosecute a federal judge before impeaching her is simply 
another manifestation of the flawed efficiency argument. This flaw 
may help to explain why the Claiborne majority opinion is so 
unsatisfying. 
III. CLAIBORNE AND HASTINGS REVISITED 
A. Claiborne 
Judge Claiborne's is the first case to exhibit all the discussed 
problems with the prosecution-before-impeachment standard, both be-
cause he is the first judge to have exhausted all available judicial ap-
peals, 195 and the first to be impeached after conviction. The Ninth 
192. See note 200 infra {describing then-Chief Justice Burger's involvement in Claiborne's 
case). 
193. See note 133 supra and accompanying text. 
194. 770 F.2d 1093, 1111 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (quoting Immigration and Naturalization Scrv. v. 
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983)), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3262 (1986). 
195. Numerous Claiborne opinions have been written: United States v. Claiborne, 727 F.2d 
842 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 829 (1984) (motion to quash indictment denied); Claiborne 
v. United States, 465 U.S. 1305 (1984) (Rehnquist, J., as Circuit Justice, denying stay of criminal 
prosecution); United States v. Claiborne, 765 F.2d 784 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 
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Circuit majority relied heavily on precedent set in the cases of Judges 
Kerner196 and Hastings197 to reject Claiborne's substantive constitu-
tional arguments against his being subject to criminal prosecution 
while a sitting federal judge.198 This reliance neglected the fact that 
neither of these judges' cases needed to address the difficult issue of 
imprisoning a sitting federal judge.199 
Judge Claiborne's fundamental contention was that it is unconsti-
tutional to prosecute - and certainly to imprison - an article III 
judge before he is removed from office by impeachment.200 He made 
1636 (1986) (affirming conviction, denying hearing en bane) and three dissents from denial of 
hearing en bane, 781 F.2d 1325, (Ferguson, J., dissenting) (9th Cir. 1985), 781 F.2d 1327, (Rein-
hardt, J., dissenting), 781 F.2d 1334 (Pregerson, J., dissenting) (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. 
Claiborne, 790 F.2d 1355 (9th Cir. 1986) (denial of stay of execution of sentence). 
196. United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974). 
197. United States v. Hastings, 681 F.2d 706 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1203 
(1983). 
198. Claiborne, 727 F.2d at 844-49; Claiborne, 465 U.S. at 1306 (Rehnquist, J., as Circuit 
Justice); see also Claiborne, 790 F.2d at 1356 (Fletcher and Kozinski, JJ., dissenting). 
199. See notes 27-38 supra and accompanying text. 
200. Claiborne made numerous additional charges of error regarding his prosecution. See 1 
Claiborne Impeachment Trial Comm. Hearings, supra note 11, at 193-271. Most prominent is his 
allegation that he was vindictively singled out for prosecution by the Department of Justice and 
the F.B.I. because of decisions he made while on the bench that disappointed the government. 
Claiborne, 165 F.2d at 805; see also Accused Judge Says Impeachment Imperils Judiciary's Inde-
pendence, N.Y. Times, Sept. 24, 1986, at A26, col. I; Impeached Judge Ends Testimony Before 
Panel, Wash. Post, Sept. 24, 1986, at AlO, col. 1; Claiborne, 781 F.2d at 1328 (Reinhardt, J., 
dissenting). 
Judge Reinhardt repeated these charges in a dissent he originally filed and published in the 
advance paperback copies of the Federal Reporter. However, he subsequently vacated his opin-
ion and withdrew it from the bound volume. Compare the paperback issue, United States v. 
Claiborne, 790 F.2d 1357, 1358 (9th Cir. 1986) ("This is a most unusual case .... [O]ver a 
period of years, [a sitting federal judge has] made allegations that federal law enforcement au-
thorities were out to destroy him, and that they were engaged in a campaign of lawlessness, 
intimidation and deception."), with the bound volume, 790 F.2d at 1358-60 (noting that Judge 
Reinhardt's opinion "published in the advance sheet at this citation ... was vacated and with-
drawn from the bound volume"). The particular curiosity of a judge vacating a published opin-
ion which recounted charges of executive branch improprieties cannot be missed. 
Claiborne's allegations are supported by the fact that every judge who heard his case - both 
in trial and on appeal - was handpicked for the purpose. 781 F.2d 1327 at 1332. Because his 
colleagues within his district initially recused themselves, judges were designated by Chief Justice 
Burger to hear Claiborne's trial and appeal. 781 F.2d at 1329-30. The purpose of recusals is to 
ensure defendants fair trials by enabling a potentially biased judge to not hear a case. However, 
Claiborne asserts that because he was the victim of a Justice Department vendetta, the recusals 
themselves ensured that he would not be tried fairly, 781 F.2d at 1332-33, because the procedure 
by which his judges were selected was unusual. Normally, the Chief Justice, under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 291 (1982), specially designates a substitute panel of judges upon request ("certificate of neces-
sity") from a Circuit Chief Judge. In Claiborne's case the panel was appointed by Chief Justice 
Burger nearly a full month before the Ninth Circuit Chief Judge requested it. See Did Burger 
Violate Law in Claiborne Case?, Natl. L.J., Feb. 17, 1986, at 3, col. !. This led Ninth Circuit 
Judge Reinhardt, in a dissent that he did not vacate, to conclude that in its attempt to avoid the 
appearance of granting their District Court colleague beneficial special treatment, the Ninth Cir-
cuit's refusal to hear the case 
allows the record to rest with the appearance that Judge Claiborne may have been the object 
of adverse special treatment, and, thus, the victim of injustice .... There is ... a rather 
substantial appearance of injustice when a defendant who claims he is the victim of a ven-
detta on the part of various branches and agencies of the Department of Justice is deprived 
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two basic supporting arguments, the first of which, relying on the con-
stitutional language of article I, section 3, clause 7, has already been 
discussed at length.201 
Claiborne's second line of reasoning, however, is arguably one on 
which the continued independence of the judiciary relies. He con-
tended that imprisoning him while he was still an article III judge 
amounted to depriving him of his office, because it deprived him of his 
docket and all of his duties. Being so deprived before impeachment 
not only skirted the constitutionally mandated procedural safeguards 
for removal, but also created "a constitutional . . . collision between 
two branches of our government" by compelling a sitting article III 
judge "to surrender to the custody of the Attorney General, an officer 
of the executive branch; ... [to] be confined outside his district, disen-
abled from performing judicial functions."202 If life tenure means any-
thing at all, it is that "a judge has judicial authority unless and until 
that power is stripped by congressional impeachment."203 Claiborne's 
argument was that since the legislature, not the executive, is charged 
with removing judges, the Attorney General's usurpation of the judi-
cial removal process violates separation of powers principles. And be-
cause criminal prosecution necessarily presupposes the potential for 
imprisonment - a de facto removal from office - prosecution before 
impeachment must be prohibited.204 
However, the court rejected the assertion that "criminal prosecu-
tion is the equivalent of removal from office."205 While admitting that 
"federal judges [can] be removed from office only by impeach-
ment, " 206 the court resolutely resisted any suggestion that this princi-
ple might also require impeachment before prosecution. It did so by 
of the opportunity to be judged by those who would normally preside over his case and 
instead is tried and convicted before, and has his appeal heard by, judges all of whom are 
specially selected for their assignments. 
781 F.2d 1327, 1132-33 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original, citation omitted). 
The selective prosecution allegation is but a corollary to Claiborne's constitutional challenges. 
Nevertheless, Justice Burger's haste, when combined with his well-known ties to the executive 
branch administration, calls into question his own independence vis-a-vis the Justice Department, 
and further demonstrates the indispensability of a judiciary independent of the executive branch. 
201. See notes 92-95 supra and accompanying text. The Claiborne majority rejected this 
argument by relying on Isaacs and Hastings precedent, finding Claiborne's interpretation of the 
"party convicted" language "tortured," and that U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 3 intends only to "assure 
that after impeachment a trial on criminal charges is not foreclosed by the principle of double 
jeopardy." Claiborne, 727 F.2d at 845-46 (citing United States v. Hastings, 681 F.2d 706, 710 
(11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1203 (1983), and United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124, 
1142 (7th Cir.) (citing R. BERGER, supra note 12, at 78-80), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974)). 
202. Claiborne, 790 F.2d 1355, 1360 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 
203. Catz, Removal of Federal Judges By Imprisomnent, 18 RUTGERS L.J. 103, 109 (1986). 
204. 790 F.2d 1355, 1356 (Fletcher, J., dissenting), 1359-60 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 
205. Claiborne, 721 F.2d at 846. 
206. 727 F.2d at 846 (citing Black, J., in Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit, 
398 U.S. 74 (1970)). 
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analogizing to the criminal prosecution and removal of Senators. 207 
The court reasoned, citing Isaacs, that since the Supreme Court settled 
that criminal prosecution and conviction of a Senator does not ipso 
facto "vacate the seat of the convicted Senator, nor compel the Senate 
to expel him or to regard him as expelled by force alone of the judge-
ment, "208 neither were judges automatically removed "by force alone 
of the judgment."209 
This analogy between judges and Senators is superficial and disre-
gards key protections uniquely conferred on judicial officers. The con-
stitutional provisions for tenure, protection, and removal of Senators 
are very different from those for article III judges, because the tenure 
of Members of Congress is not guided by the same concerns for inde-
pendence and separation of powers that control judicial tenure.210 For 
example, Senators do not enjoy article III life tenure; they may be 
removed from office by expulsion,211 or may be defeated at the polls.212 
Even if the Claiborne majority's defense of the prosecution-before-
impeachment standard had been stronger, it still would not have an-
swered the problem of imprisonment before impeachment. The logical 
arguments for equating imprisonment with removal are strong: im-
prisoning a sitting judge deprives her of her docket, 213 removes her 
from her judicial district,214 and thus constructively strips her of her 
office without impeachment.215 
Most importantly, the Supreme Court has addressed the constitu-
tionality of disenabling a judge from executing judicial duties without 
impeachment. In Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit, 216 
the Court left open the question as to whether a Judicial Council order 
207. 727 F.2d at 846. 
208. Burton v. United States, 202 U.S. 344, 369 (1906). 
209. United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124, 1142-44 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 
(1974); Claiborne, 727 F.2d at 846. Isaacs also adds, citing United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 
501 (1972), that the protections granted Members of Congress through the Constitution's speech 
and debate clause, see note 98 supra, do not immunize Members from criminal prosecution. 
210. Senators are elected by their states' citizens. When a vacancy occurs in the Senate, it is 
filled by appointment from the Governor of the state in which the vacancy occurs, whereas 
federal judges are always appointed by the President. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
211. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 1. 
212. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. I; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1. 
213. It has been suggested that a prison sentence could be "tailor[ ed] ... to permit him to 
perform some judicial functions." Claiborne, 790 F.2d at 1360 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). How-
ever, as Judge Kozinski elaborated, 
The spectacle of a federal judge serving jailtime between sittings is not materially more 
grotesque than having a judge resume judicial duties after serving a prison sentence. Our 
sense of discomfort with either of these scenarios stems from the fact that Congress has not 
chosen to remove Judge Claiborne through the impeachment process. 
790 F.2d at 1360 n.4. 
214. For example, Claiborne was confined in Alabama and obviously could not perform his 
judicial duties in his Nevada District. 790 F.2d at 1360 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 
215. See also notes 31-32 supra and accompanying text. 
216. 398 U.S. 74 (1970). 
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stripping then-Judge Chandler of his docket crosses "the line defining 
the maximum permissible intervention consistent with the constitu-
tional requirement of judicial independence."217 Chief Justice Bur-
ger's majority opinion found the case not ripe for decision,218 explicitly 
leaving open the critical question as to what, if anything, amounts to 
"removal" of a federal judge from office before impeachment. 
However, in order for this question to be meaningful, the Court 
must have assumed that if alternative removal occurred, it would be 
unconstitutional.219 This may be the most important aspect of the 
Chandler majority opinion. By acknowledging that there is a consti-
tutional limit to its intervention in a federal judge's tenure,220 it im-
plicitly acknowledged that situations exist that would amount to 
judicial removal without impeachment; and, crucially, that if they oc-
curred, they would be illegal. Otherwise, there would have been no 
question to leave open. 
Strongly worded Chandler dissents by Justices Black and Douglas 
have produced oft-quoted language supporting the conclusion that 
denying a judge her docket without impeachment is equivalent to un-
constitutional removal.221 Chandler involved a Judicial Council order 
that Judge Chandler " 'take no action whatsoever in any case or pro-
ceeding now or hereafter pending' in his court."222 Justice Douglas 
characterized this order as "mov[ing] against the individual with all of 
the sting and much of the stigma that impeachment carries."223 De-
crying the dangers of allowing the Judicial Council thus to overstep its 
jurisdiction, Douglas illustrated the harmful repercussions of so casu-
ally dispensing with the independence of the judiciary: 
[T]here is no power under our Constitution for one group of federal 
217. 398 U.S. at 84. 
218. Chandler had not exhausted all avenues ofrelief through the Council itself. 398 U.S. at 
88-89. Justice Douglas, in dissent, notes that Chandler could not exhaust all of his options to 
express his disagreement with the Judicial Council order because to do so would have been stra-
tegically harmful because his case was against the Judicial Council itself. His open expression of 
disagreement would have triggered a provision of the 1948 Act creating the Judicial Councils, 28 
U.S.C. § 137 (1982), which expanded the Council's authority "[i]f the district judges in any dis-
trict are unable to agree." 398 U.S. at 131-32 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
219. 398 U.S. at 84. 
220. 398 U.S. at 84. 
221. See, e.g .. Hastings v. Judicial Conference of the United States, 770 F.2d 1093, 1106 & 
n.10, I 107 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Edwards, J., concurring); Shipley, Legislative Control of Judicial 
Behavior, 35 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 178, 194, 198 (1970); see also Note, The Chandler Inci-
dent, supra note 67, passim; Ervin, supra note 12, at 125-26; Stolz, supra note 102, passim. In 
fact, the Claibome majority even turns to the Chandler dissents in support of the argument that 
federal judges are not immune from criminal prosecution. United States v. Claiborne, 727 F.2d 
842, 846 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 829 (1984). 
222. Chandler, 398 U.S. at 136 (Douglas, J., dissenting). See also Chandler v. Judicial Coun-
cil of the Tenth Circuit, 382 U.S. 1003, 1004 (I 966) (Black, J., dissenting from denial of stay of 
order). 
223. Chandler. 398 U.S. at 135. 
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judges to censor or discipline any federal judge ... [or] strip him of his 
power to act as a judge . 
. . . The power to keep a particular judge from sitting on a racial case, 
a church-and-state case, a free-press case, a search-and-seizure case, a 
railroad case, an antitrust case, or a union case may have profound con-
sequences. Judges are not fungible.224 
Admittedly, the only detailed language delineating the boundaries 
of constitutional behavior in Chandler is in these dissenting opinions. 
But the majority's opinion is built on an essential idea: that impeach-
ment is the sole constitutional judicial removal method, due to the 
need for an independent judiciary. Unfortunately, the Claiborne court 
did not heed Chandler's message. 
The Claiborne court also based its rejection of Claiborne's argu-
ment on the Isaacs and Hastings decisions. Though acknowledging 
the importance of the "salutary principles of separation of powers and 
judicial independence, "225 the court nevertheless ignored the danger 
that "the judiciary would be subject to intolerable pressures from the 
executive branch if executive officers [a]re permitted to prosecute ac-
tive federal judges."226 It dismissed Claiborne's predictions of the 
prosecution's practical damage, such as biasing an acquitted judge 
against the executive branch in any subsequent suits, as "over-
stated. "227 Instead, the court simply restated that "Article III protec-
tions . . . should not be expanded to insulate federal judges from 
punishment for their criminal wrongdoing."228 
Thus the Claiborne decision depends heavily on the maxim that 
"no man ... is above the law."229 This reliance is disturbing, because 
the truism begs the essential question. No one contends that judges 
are above the law. The really difficult question is when, not whether, 
an article III judge may be subjected to the criminal process. The 
court should be asking how the law can best be enforced in order to 
avoid damaging the constitutional system. 
The "immunity" Claiborne asserted is one of process, not unlike 
numerous other constitutional privileges and immunities for govern-
mental officers, 23° and even for indicted citizens. Constitutional pro-
224. 398 U.S. at 137. 
225. Claiborne, 727 F.2d at 847. 
226. 727 F.2d at 847. 
227. 727 F.2d at 848-49. 
228. 727 F.2d at 847. 
229. 727 F.2d at 845 (quoting United States v. Hastings, 681 F.2d 706, 711 (I Ith Cir. 1982), 
cert. de11ied, 459 U.S. 1203 (1983), and United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124, 11[4]3 (7th Cir.), 
cert. de11ied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974)). See also 727 F.2d at 847-48, 849. 
230. See note 165 supra and accompanying text. See also Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 
(1982) (granting the President absolute immunity from civil damages for his official acts); Butz v. 
Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978) (absolute immunity attaches to certain "exceptional" functions 
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tective procedures are as indispensable here as they are, for example, 
in fourth, fifth, and sixth amendment protections.231 They protect 
fundamental systemic values which could othenvise be lost in the exi-
gencies of an individual case. 
B. Hastings 
Judge Hastings' case is unusual in that he was tried and acquitted 
of criminal charges before being impeached. 232 Hastings was found 
not guilty on charges of bribery, conspiracy, and obstruction of justice 
in a jury trial in February 1983.233 Nevertheless, shortly after his ac-
quittal, the Eleventh Circuit Judicial Council created a special investi-
gative panel under the Judicial Conduct Act234 to investigate 
complaints about Hastings. This five-judge special investigative panel 
spent three years preparing its report.235 This report led the Eleventh 
Circuit Judicial Council to file its own report with the United States 
Judicial Conference concluding that Hastings had "engaged in ob-
struction of justice" to avoid conviction on conspiracy and bribery 
charges.236 On March 17, 1987, the Judicial Conference certified to 
the House of Representatives its determination that Judge Hastings' 
impeachment may be warranted.237 Hastings recently lost his suit in 
the D.C. Court of Appeals, charging that the panel's activities, and 
much of the Judicial Conduct Act, were unconstitutional.238 
Hastings' basic argument was that the Act violates separation of 
powers doctrine because only Congress may discipline judges for mis-
conduct in office.239 Although that issue is not central here,240 it is 
worth noting that the Judicial Conduct Act "has not yet been deter-
of public officials); Ryan v. Bilby, 764 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir. 1985) (judicial officers and prosecutors 
are absolutely immune from certain types of suit). 
231. E.g., U.S. CONST. amend. IV (prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures); U.S. 
CONST. amend. V (self-incrimination and due process protections); U.S. CONST. amend. VI 
(speedy trial and impartial jury guarantees). 
232. See notes 21-22 supra and accompanying text. 
233. See Hastings v. Judicial Conference of the United States, 829 F.2d 91, 95 (D.C. Cir. 
1987) (''Hastings II"); Judge Acquitted in '83 Says Panel Seeks Impeachmelll, N.Y. Times, Aug. 
27, 1986, at 9, col. 5. 
234. See note 50 supra. 
235. See generally Judge Acquitted in '83 Says Panel Seeks Impeachment, N.Y. Times, Aug. 
27, 1986, at 9, col. 5; Hastings Challenges Panel Findings, Natl. L.J., Sept. 8, 1986, at 10, col. 1. 
236. Hastings IL 829 F.2d at 97. 
237. 829 F.2d at 97. 
238. 829 F.2d at 94. This is actually the second time Hastings challenged the constitutional-
ity of the Judicial Conduct Act. The first challenge was dismissed as premature, pending the 
results of the Eleventh Circuit's Investigating Committee. Hastings v. Judicial Conference of the 
United States, 770 F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1985) ("Hastings!"). 
239. Hastings IL 829 F.2d at 97-98. 
240. For a thorough examination of this question, see Note, Unnecessary and Improper: The 
Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, 94 YALE L.J. 1117 
(1985). 
November 1987] Note - Judicial Impeachment 461 
mined authoritatively [to be constitutional] and is not beyond ques-
tion. "241 However, the Act is carefully structured so that Congress 
retains all ultimate removal power, thus avoiding any direct constitu-
tional confrontation with Congress' impeachment authority.242 
Yet Hastings' proceedings clearly illustrate another important 
point, namely the inevitable practical problems encountered when a 
judge is criminally tried before being impeached. This time the diffi-
culties are the converse of those in Claiborne; the operative issue here 
is how a judicial acquittal may be used. 
The Claiborne case presented the procedural difficulties surround-
ing impeachment after conviction. As articulated by Representative 
Rodino, these included: 
Is the Senate obliged to litigate the ... charges de novo? Alternatively, 
should the Senate accept the fact of the conviction itself as sufficient evi-
dence of misconduct? Should the Senate preclude the relitigation of facts 
. . . necessarily determined in the prior criminal proceeding? . . . 
[I]nstead of relitigating those facts, [may the Senate] satisf[y] itself that 
there was a substantial record ... and that Judge Claiborne was afforded 
substantive and procedural due process ... ?243 
Representative Hyde further elaborated, 
How do you reconcile the proposition that we should credit the record 
made in the U.S. courts with the doctrine of separation of powers and 
with the constitutional provision [granting] the Senate ... the sole power 
to try impeachment[s]? How can we then either be bound by or depend 
241. Geras v. Lafayette Display Fixtures, Inc., 742 F.2d 1037, 1053 (7th Cir. 1984) (Posner, 
J., dissenting). The first D.C. Circuit Hastings decision acknowledged that not every Judicial 
Council action was necessarily constitutional. Hastings I, 770 F.2d at 1099 ("[T]he precise limits 
to the powers that could constitutionally be exercised by the judicial councils and the Judicial 
Conference have yet to be judicially defined."). 
242. In fact, it is only upon this basis that the second Hastings decision affirmed the constitu-
tionality of the Judicial Conduct Act. The D.C. Circuit Court explained that "because ... the 
duty placed on the Conference [is] discretionary rather than mandatory, [it] thus blunt[s] any 
concern with its effect on the separation of powers." Hastings IL 829 F.2d at 95. In other words, 
if the judiciary could independently force a judge's impeachment without an express congres-
sional directive, this would amount to unconstitutional judicial intrusion into the impeachment 
authority. 
28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(7)(B) (1982) requires that findings by any circuit Judicial Council that 
"might constitute one or more grounds for impeachment under article I of the Constitution" 
must be transferred to the U.S. Judicial Conference. If the Judicial Conference determines that 
consideration of impeachment is warranted, it then hands the case over to the U.S. House of 
Representatives "for whatever action the House of Representatives considers to be necessary." 
28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(8) (1982). Hastings II makes clear that it is the discretionary language of the 
Judicial Conduct Act that keeps the Act constitutional: if the Act vested too much power over 
the legislature's impeachment proceedings in the judiciary, it would violate separation of powers 
principles. Hastings IL 829 F.2d at 101-03. 
That said, there is a powerful argument that the Judicial Conduct Act does vest too much 
removal power in the judiciary. Because the language "seemingly permits a council to order, for 
example, that no further cases be assigned a fifty-year-old judge for a temporary and certain 
period of forty years," it may enable the judiciary effectively to remove a judge in circumvention 
of the impeachment process. See Note, supra note 240, at 1132. 
243. 1 Claiborne Impeachment Trial Comm. Hearings, supra note 11, at 43. 
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on the record in the criminal court?244 
These issues also arose in Judge Hastings' case. But they were fur-
ther complicated by the fact that the trial court acquitted him, so the 
very fact of his acquittal gave his impeachment scenario an invidious 
tint: the Judicial Council looks as if it attempted to overrule a jury. It 
did not try to mask this objective by asserting that Hastings' criminal 
trial had somehow soiled his office245 or that his judicial performance 
was otherwise substandard. Instead the Council charged that Has-
tings' criminal defense was an obstruction of justice. The Council 
sought to impeach him for "guilt" the jury somehow missed. 
If Hastings had been impeached before his criminal trial, some 
may have charged that it would have seemed unfair to him, because of 
his acquittal. However, if he had been impeached first, the described 
dilemma would have been avoided. As the situation now stands, the 
Council's actions appear somewhat vindictive, and Judge Hastings 
himself is no better off than if he had been impeached before his ac-
quittal: he still faces impeachment.246 
This constitutional predicament may once again be best captured 
by Judge Edwards, here concurring with the dismissal (for lack of 
ripeness) of Hastings' first challenge to the Judicial Conference's 
actions: 
Although I have no reason to doubt the integrity of members of the 
federal judiciary, I am willing to assume that there may be a few corrupt 
judges, who dishonor their title and role in our society. This does not 
change my view, however, that the Constitution specifies only one proce-
dure for disciplining them - impeachment.247 
CONCLUSION 
Until recently, impeachment was assumed to be the exclusive con-
stitutional remedy for disciplining sitting article III judges, but this 
did not preclude their criminal prosecution once removed from office. 
A modem prosecution-before-impeachment approach, exemplified by 
the recent criminal convictions of Judges Claiborne and Nixon, raises 
a troublesome repercussion: criminal prosecutions presume the possi-
bility of conviction and imprisonment, yet imprisoning a sitting federal 
judge logically removes her from her judicial responsibilities. This re-
sults in two problems: tax dollars must continue to pay large salaries 
to inoperative judges; and the protections afforded the entire judiciary 
by the impeachment process are circumvented. 
Impeachment is a constitutional safeguard that protects the inde-
244. I id. at 45. 
245. See Part Il.B.3 supra. 
246. See Hastings IL 829 F.2d at 97; Congress Releases Hastings Report, Natl. L.J., Oct. 19, 
1987, at 3, col. I. 
247. Hastings l 170 F.2d at 1111 (Edwards, J., concurring). 
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pendence and impartiality of the judiciary. It is one of many special 
procedures in the Constitution for the protection of our system of gov-
ernment. These procedures always have costs, but their expense only 
reflects the value of the societal benefits preserved. 
The need to protect the independence and integrity of the judiciary 
and to preserve the separation of powers has not changed over the last 
two centuries. In fact, the importance of such protection is acknowl-
edged even by those who seek to weaken it. Gerald McDowell, the 
Justice Department attorney who oversaw the Claiborne and Nixon 
prosecutions, summarizes the problem - and, ironically, its only con-
stitutional resolution - all too well: 
It should be difficult ... to impeach a Federal judge. I'm outraged in the 
particular[s] [of the Claiborne and Nixon cases]. But ifl were a philoso-
pher, I'd say its a reasonable price to pay. It's not a terrible abuse 
when you consider that the judges who are honest have a sense of 
independence. 248 
- Melissa H. Maxman 
248. Shenon, Impeachment of Judges: A 'Cumbersome Tool,' N.Y. Times, Apr. 2, 1986, at 
Al6, col. 3. 
